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Abstract
In the last century, standards of living around the world have improved. However, this
progress has not been equal across, nor within countries. This dissertation consists of three
chapters that aim to contribute to answering the question of why this has been the case, in
three separate contexts.
Chapter 1: I test whether the implementation of the California Paid Family Leave Act
increased young women’s human capital investment, specifically college enrollment. Using a
synthetic control approach, I estimate that the policy increased the probability that women
enroll in college by about 2 percentage points. This effect is statistically significant at the
5% level and persists for at least several years. I present a simple human capital model
of women’s schooling choices that characterizes these results as the effect of an expected
decrease in the effects of motherhood on labor supply. Finally, I present evidence from
survey data and Internet searches that provides support to the hypothesized mechanism:
women are more likely to enroll in college because they expect that the policy will increase
their future labor supply.
Chapter 2: Directly eliciting individuals’ subjective beliefs via surveys is increasingly
popular in social science research, but doing so via face-to-face surveys has an important
downside: the interviewer’s knowledge of the topic may spill over onto the respondent’s
recorded beliefs. Using a randomized experiment that used interviewers to implement an
information treatment, we show that reported beliefs are significantly shifted by interviewer
knowledge. Trained interviewers primed respondents to use the exact numbers used in the
training, nudging them away from higher answers; recorded responses decreased by about
0.3 standard deviations of the initial belief distribution. Furthermore, respondents with
stronger prior beliefs were less affected by interviewer knowledge.
Chapter 3: Governments across the world subsidize soup kitchen programs, but there
is little evidence on whether these improve food security. I study a soup kitchen program
funded by the Mexican government in 2013 to examine whether it has caused an improve-
ment in food security. I find no mean municipal effects for six different measures of food
security. I analyze a sub sample of the most food insecure and identify some positive effects
within that sector of the population. My results suggest that the effect of the program
on food security is concentrated in the lower end of the food security distribution, but
challenge the assumption that subsidizing prepared food will mechanically improve mean
food security significantly. I also estimate that the presence of soup kitchens in the most
ex-ante food insecure municipalities decreases average food expenditures. This result points
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The world has seen a striking improvement in the standard of living in the last century.
Nevertheless, progress has not been equal across, or even within, countries. Which socioe-
conomic frictions have prevented some groups from benefiting as much as others? How can
we remove them?
There may not be one simple answer to the above question. I therefore focus on different
margins separately. The ultimate goal is to understand what the frictions are to general
progress so that we can remove them. In this dissertation, I study two policies designed to
reduce such frictions: soup kitchens and paid maternity leave. In addition, I investigate a
technical issue that often arises in the study of economic development: problems eliciting
subjective beliefs, which influence decision-making under uncertainty.
The first margin that I focus on is gender and the labor market. The gap between
women’s and men’s wages and employment has been widely documented. While the gap
has been narrowed on several dimensions, it is persistent. A smaller share of women than
men participate in the labor force, and women earn less on average. Economists and other
social scientists have investigated the persistence of this gap, and some policies have been
put in place or redesigned to try to reduce it. One such policy is paid maternity leave.
Social scientists have found evidence of different effects of paid maternity leave programs.
When they receive at least partial pay, women take longer maternity leave than when it
is unpaid (Baum and Ruhm, 2016), and women’s employment, hours worked and wages
after giving birth increase as a result of these policies (Dustmann and Schönberg (2012),
Rossin-Slater et al. (2013)).
In Chapter 2, I study the effect of the California Paid Family Leave Act on women’s
schooling. If women anticipate that paid maternity leave increases job retention after hav-
ing a child, the expected benefit of schooling increases, as women would earn benefits from
their human capital over a longer period. Another possibility is that women interpret the
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implementation of these policies as a signal of more parent-friendly workplaces, decreasing
the expected cost of motherhood, which in turn increases the likelihood that women con-
tinue working after having a child. I focus on the effect of paid maternity leave on college
enrollment rates, using the synthetic control method of Abadie et al. (2010).
My results show that, for women, the policy is associated with a 1.8 percent-point
increase in the probability of starting college. Studying indirect effects of maternity leave
policies is key to understanding the determinants of labor market disparities, and the effects
that policies may have on them. Furthermore, my results provide evidence that women’s
labor-force participation is hindered by the tradeoffs they face between motherhood and
their careers, which is an important insight for policymakers.
In Chapter 3, I explore interviewer knowledge effects in subjective belief elicitation.
Uncertainty is an intrinsic part of people’s lives. When making decisions, people often do
not know the objective probabilities of an outcome, but they have a set of beliefs about the
likelihood of different scenarios. These beliefs influence the decisions they make. For this
reason, researchers often want to study people’s beliefs about the probabilities of specific
events, particularly in health-related issues, where people, and even more so the poor, face
substantial uncertainty.
Researchers have designed several ways to elicit these beliefs. This is usually done
through in-person interviews. This chapter studies a potential problem with this method:
the possibility that what the interviewer knows or believes may contaminate the respon-
dents’ answers. This work is coauthored with Professor Jason Kerwin, who performed the
original experiment.
Interviewer effects have been documented in many contexts: participants give different
answers to questions depending on characteristics of who is asking. Examples include
interviewer’s race and ethnicity (Adida et al. (2011), Cotter et al. (1982), and Dionne
(2014)), gender (Becker et al. (1995), and McCombie and Anarfi (2002)) and social or
cultural proximity (Weinreb (2006)).
In this chapter we study whether information held by interviewers contaminates partic-
ipants’ answers about their own beliefs. Interviewers that had received information about
the true transmission risk of HIV elicited lower average baseline responses, closer to the
true transmission risk. Informed interviewers appear to have primed respondents to use
the exact numbers used in the information training, and nudged them away from higher
answers. We find that recorded responses decrease by about 0.3 standard deviations of the
initial belief distribution.
After identifying this effect, we suggest corrections from the perspectives of interviewer
recruitment, survey design, experiment setup, and data analysis. This aids researchers
in designing better instruments to study people’s subjective beliefs, minimizing the risk
2
of contamination. Understanding biases in recorded risk beliefs is very important, since
subjective beliefs are examined extensively in the study of economic development. If our
measures of risk beliefs are biased, we will have a harder time studying the behaviors that
depend on them, and some of these behaviors are very important to the study of economic
development.
Preventing hunger and malnutrition has been a major concern for developed and devel-
oping countries. Increasingly so as the literature has found various negative effects of food
insecurity. Malnutrition and food insecurity have short and long term effects on variables
ranging from low productivity to decreased child health (Gundersen and Kreider, 2009) and
reduced non-cognitive development (Howard, 2011).
Governments and international organizations expend large amounts of resources on pro-
grams aimed at improving food security, including soup kitchens. Programs operate under
the assumption that setting up soup kitchens will automatically reduce overall food inse-
curity, yet there is little evidence to show whether these interventions have the intended
effect. There may be barriers to food security aside from availability. For example, people
may have work schedules that prevent them from attending at specific times, people may
commute away from their place of residence or they may be simply unaware of the program.
In Chapter 4 of this dissertation I study whether a soup kitchen program, funded by
the Mexican government, has improved local food security. I take a difference-in-differences
approach using six different measures of food security, restricting the analysis to disadvan-
taged municipalities. I first find that the program is not associated with higher average
municipal food security for disadvantaged municipalities. When analyzing only the most
food insecure municipalities, I find positive effects on food security. These results suggest
that the effect of the program is concentrated among the least food secure households.
My results challenge the assumption that subsidizing prepared food will automatically
improve average food security. Still, my results are encouraging, as they show positive effects
on the most food insecure, and a reduction in food expenditure for this group as well. This
chapter stresses the importance of rethinking policy, as seemingly intuitive solutions may
be missing key components of the underlying problem, and also highlights the fact that
policymakers sometimes have different priorities than program beneficiaries themselves.
These three chapters share a common goal: better understanding barriers that under-
privileged groups systematically face. Understanding these frictions is the main goal of my
dissertation as a whole, and my research agenda for the future. Whether studying specific
policies or contributing to improve research methods, my goal is to continue doing research
that can help improve the lives of underprivileged groups. I want to continue working to
answer questions that can inform policy to this end, either in an academic setting or within
an international research organization.
3
Chapter 2




Women face important tradeoffs between work and family. Despite the increase in female
labor supply in the last century, women still encounter several barriers to participation in
the laborforce. These include lower salaries, barriers to promotion, and pregnancy related
job loss. Maternity leave policies were originally established to provide some protection
from gender discrimination in the workplace, so that women could have some time to bond
with their children and recover from childbirth without risking their jobs. These policies
have been promoted as a way to ease the tradeoffs between work and family that women
face, especially given the cultural expectation that they take the role of primary caregivers
for their children.
Economists and other social scientists have studied some implications of maternity leave
policies. Particular attention has been paid to effects on women’s labor market outcomes,
including those on female labor supply, female labor earnings, and the gender gap in em-
ployment outcomes. Despite considerable interest in the effects of these policies on women’s
labor-market outcomes, effects on women’s human capital investment decisions have not yet
been studied. If these policies have impacts on women’s labor-market outcomes, or if women
believe they will, investments decisions should respond.
I study the question of whether paid maternity leave changes women’s human capital
investment decisions. I propose that women make investment decisions based on their
expectations of the returns to those investments. Do women expect maternity leave to ease
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the work-family tradeoffs that they face? Are women’s educational choices constrained by
these tradeoffs?
I use the introduction of the California Paid Family Leave Act (CPFLA), which was the
first of its kind in the US, to estimate the relationship between paid maternity leave and
women’s human capital investment decisions. I use the synthetic control approach of Abadie
and Gardeazabal (2003) to compare women in California who were likely to make their
college enrollment decisions before and after the policy went into effect to two equivalent
groups of women in the synthetic control. I estimate that the policy increased female
college enrollment by about two percentage points. This effect is statistically significant
and persists for at least several years.
Beyond the rationale that it reduces discrimination in the workplace, promoters of ma-
ternity leave argue that these policies are welfare increasing for mothers and children. There
is evidence of improvements in child health outcomes, including increases in birth weight
and a reduction in infant mortality among children of highly educated, married women
(Rossin (2011)), as well as long-term benefits for children, such as higher wages and lower
high-school dropout rates (Carneiro et al. (2015b)).
One literature has focused on the effects of maternity leave policies on women’s labor
market outcomes and the gender gap. Researchers have found that mothers tend to extend
their leave when the leave is paid (Baum and Ruhm (2013)), and that paid leave increases
hours worked and wages (Rossin-Slater et al. (2011)). Women are more likely to be employed
9 to 12 months after giving birth (Baum and Ruhm (2013)), and overall job retention after
having a child increases (?, Rossin-Slater et al. (2011)). However, Bailey et al. (2019)
provide evidence that, over the long term, the CPFLA has not decreased the gender gap in
labor force participation, and may have widened it for some groups. They also find lower
employment levels for new mothers who used paid leave. The lack of apparent consensus
in the literature regarding the effects of maternity leave policies on women’s labor-market
outcomes stems in part from the fact that different features of maternity leave policies may
have different impacts. For example, the selection effects of the job-protection and wage
replacement features of paid leave policies may be in different directions (Rossin-Slater
(2017), Stearns (2015)).
Despite this extensive interest in the effects of maternity leave policies on women’s labor
supply, little attention has been paid to the effects of these policies on women’s human
capital investment decisions. Expected effects of maternity leave policies on labor market
outcomes may provide incentives for women to increase investments in their human capital.
Women may interpret mandated paid maternity leave policies as a signal of more parent-
friendly work environments or, more generally, as a decrease in the cost of motherhood
on their labor supply. Women can then be expected to increase their labor supply, either
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along the intensive or the extensive margins, relative to the counterfactual scenario of no
such policy. Under these conditions, each additional unit of human capital becomes more
profitable, as it would yield benefits over a longer period of time. In other words, if women
expect to work more as a result of this policy, investing in their human capital is more
profitable.
These effects can arise regardless of whether women actually remain in the labor-force
after motherhood. The expectation that they are more likely to remain in the labor-force
after having a child is enough to drive an increase in investment, in this case college en-
rollment. In other words, beyond what happens to labor supply ex-post, women make
investment decisions using their ex-ante expectations of what will happen to their labor
supply. Because at the time of implementation of the CPFLA, paid maternity leave policies
were new in the US, there had not been much opportunity for women to update their beliefs
by observing actual effects of paid leave on labor supply. In this sense, my results are not
susceptible to the apparent lack of consensus in the literature about the labor-market effects
of maternity leave, because the mechanism does not depend on the realized effects of the
policy, but the ex-ante expectation that women have.
The contribution of this chapter is twofold. First, it shows that maternity leave policies
can influence women’s schooling decisions, and thus shows that women’s schooling decisions
are constrained by the work-family tradeoffs that they face. Second, this chapter brings
attention to the fact that women expect these policies to ease such tradeoffs.
I present a human capital accumulation model, modified from Kuziemko et al. (2018),
that rationalizes the mechanisms depicted above. The model describes women’s schooling
decisions in the face of motherhood effects on their labor supply. Working with this model,
I formalize my empirical results as women interpreting this policy as a sign of lower ex-
pected cost of motherhood on future labor supply. To further motivate my hypothesized
mechanism, I present evidence from survey data that supports the theoretical model. I
also present Google Trends data showing that interest in paid maternity leave increased in
California (more than elsewhere) around the time of policy implementation, which provides
further support to the hypothesized mechanism.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature on the
effects of maternity leave policies, and briefly describes the CPFLA. Section 3 describes
the data and my empirical strategy. Section 4 provides the synthetic control estimates.
Section 5 presents the model, Section 6 considers additional evidence that supports the




Maternity leave policies have the purpose of providing protection against workplace
discrimination, and allow time for mothers to recover from childbirth, care for, and bond
with a new child. These policies have received much interest from the research community
and policy makers. Effects of maternity leave on a variety of outcomes have been studied.
For example, there is substantial evidence that takeup increases when leave is paid or
expanded (Han et al. (2009), Baum and Ruhm (2016), Bartel et al. (2018)).
There is also evidence of positive effects on outcomes for children. Increases in leave
entitlement leads to a decline in high school dropout rates for children (Carneiro et al.
(2015a)). Paid leave increases the likelihood and duration of breastfeeding (Pac et al.
(2019)), and improves birth and health outcomes (Rossin (2011), Stearns (2015)). Bailey
et al. (2019) find evidence that the CPFLA increased the time that mothers spend with
their children.
Given labor market disparities between men and women, and gender disparities in time
allocated to child rearing, there is an extensive literature that has focused on the labor
market effects of maternity leave policies. Theoretical effects of maternity leave on post-
leave employment outcomes are ambiguous (Klerman and Leibowitz (1998)), and there is
an apparent lack of consensus in the empirical evidence.
On one hand, several studies have found that maternity leave is associated with an
increase in employment after birth (Baum and Ruhm (2016), Kluve and Tamm (2013)), job
attachment (Baum and Ruhm (2016), Byker (2016)), and hours and weeks worked (Rossin-
Slater et al. (2013)). It is important to note that these effects are measured at different
times. For example, effects may differ three years after birth vs. in the period directly
before and after childbirth. The effects of these policies are plausibly different in different
moments of the child’s life, and for different parities.
In contrast, Bailey et al. (2019) use a large administrative data set to evaluate the long
term effects of the CPFLA. They find no evidence that the policy has closed the gender gap
in labor-market outcomes such as employment, wage earnings or job attachment. In fact,
they find a reduction in annual wages for new mothers who take leave via the CPFLA.
The apparent lack of consensus on the effects of maternity leave policies on women’s fu-
ture labor market outcomes likely partially stems from the variation that exists in maternity
leave policies and how these interact with the context (see Rossin-Slater (2017) for a com-
prehensive review of the literature on maternity leave policies). Different features of leave
policies may have different effects. For example, FMLA offers job protection but no wage
replacement, while CPFLA offers partial wage replacement but no job protection. These
7
two features may impact have different effects across different groups of women (Stearns
(2015)). There is evidence of large heterogeneity in the effects across income groups (Bai-
ley et al. (2019), Bedard and Rossin-Slater (2016)), and the effects may be very different
depending on the length of the leave (Lequien (2012)).
The lack of conclusive evidence notwithstanding, to study the effects of women’s school-
ing decisions, what matters is what women expect to happen, ex-ante. In particular, what
they expect at the time when they make their investment decisions. In the case of the
CPFLA, women had little evidence on what would happen to their labor supply post moth-
erhood, since this was the first mandated paid maternity leave policy implemented in the
US.
In Kuziemko et al. (2018), it is shown that in the US and the UK, women have increased
their schooling in the last few decades despite the fact that women are not working outside
the home much more than before. The authors frame these two facts as women systemati-
cally underestimating the cost of motherhood on their labor supply. Women make schooling
decisions expecting they will work after motherhood, but when they become mothers they
receive an information shock and realize it is too costly to do both, so they end up with
inefficiently high levels of human capital for the labor they end up supplying.
Kuziemko et al. (2018) argue that the reason for this systematic underestimation is
that the cost of motherhood on labor supply has increased across cohorts, but women
make decisions as if it had remained constant. The authors suggest that this increase is
not driven by the work side of the work-family tradeoff, but by the family side, perhaps
via increased requirements on childbearing (such as the promotion of breast feeding) or
decreased support from networks. In this chapter I argue that, additionally, women may
have taken the implementation of maternity leave policies as a sign of a decrease in the work
side of the tradeoff, perhaps inferring from the implementation of maternity leave policies
that workplaces were becoming more family friendly, or that society was more accomodating
to women’s dual role as childrearers and workers.
Regardless of the evidence we currently hold about the labor market effects on women’s
labor supply, if, at the time they were making their schooling decisions, women expected
that the CPFLA would increase their probability of returning to the work place after having
a child, that would be enough to drive the effect on college enrollment I find in this chapter.
2.2.2 The California Paid Family Leave Act
Since 1993 and before the CPFLA passed, in 2004, some working women in the US were
entitled to 12 weeks of job-protected leave per child (born to them or that they adopted)
via the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). This policy also provides job-protected
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leave for other reasons, such as caring for a sick family member, and it also grants paternity
leave to eligible fathers. Parents are eligible for 12 weeks of job protection through FMLA
if they had worked for an eligible employer at least 1,250 hours in the 12 months before
taking the leave. Eligible employers include those with over 50 employees that lived within
75 miles. Fathers and mothers are entitled to the same benefits via FMLA.
The California Paid Family Leave Act introduced partial pay benefits for eligible em-
ployees living and working in the state of California, that had a new child entering the
family, or were taking care of a sick family member. Eligibility requirements include that
workers have earned $300 in wages that were subject to the State Disability Insurance
deductions. The CPFLA does not provide job protection.
Those who are eligible for both FMLA and CPFLA can take both simultaneously, thus
enjoying job protection via FMLA for up to twelve weeks, and (partial) wage replacement
via CPFLA for up to 6 weeks. Even though CPFLA has fewer eligibility restrictions than
FMLA, those women who are not eligible for FMLA may find it difficult to claim wage
replacements via CPFLA if they are not covered by job-protection policies. It is also im-
portant to note that some women, especially those earning higher wages, may have already
enjoyed paid maternity leave provided by their employers as part of a private benefit pack-
age.
2.3 Data and Empirical Strategy
2.3.1 Data and Descriptive Statistics
I use pooled Current Population Survey (CPS) data from all monthly CPS surveys from
2011 to 2017, through IPUMS-CPS.1 The monthly CPS is a rotating panel, so from the
pooled data I take the latest observation available for each woman. I drop from the sample
women who were younger than 22 when they were last interviewed, to keep only women
who have plausibly already finalized their decision of enrolling in college or not.
For privacy purposes, the CPS does not include information on participant’s year of
birth. To be able to perform aggregate analyses at the birth year-state level, I impute birth
year by subtracting age at interview and year of interview. This can generate some noise
in my imputed birth year variable, depending on month of birth and month of interview.
However, this noise is not a major concern, since my imputation would not misclassify
women by more than one calendar year, and the direction in which the misclassification
occurs is not likely related to any relevant characteristics. As a robustness check, I perform
1IPUMS-CPS, Sarah Flood, Miriam King, Steven Ruggles, and J. Robert Warren. Integrated Public Use
Microdata Series, Current Population Survey: Version 5.0. [dataset]. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota,
2017. https://doi.org/10.18128/D030.V5.0.
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the main analyses defining treatment for birth-year cohorts one and two years before and
after treatment actually occurred, and results are qualitatively similar.
As my outcome variable of interest, I define the binary variable “college enrolled”,
which takes a value of one if the woman has a college degree or any college studies, and zero
otherwise. This variable is constructed from different categories that women can select from
in the CPS when reporting their educational attainment. Women who report having 1 year
or college, some college but no degree, or anything beyond that count as college enrolled
under this categorization. Other margins of human capital accumulation can be explored in
a similar way, for example by using a binary variable for having attended graduate school
as a dependent variable.
Other variables I use from the CPS include four race and ethnicity categories (Asian,
Black, White, and Hispanic), high school graduation, and total household income. Using
the described sample from the pooled CPS data, I collapse by state and the imputed birth
year to obtain a strongly balanced panel of state and birth year averages of the variables I
use.
I abstract from fertility choices, by including women in my sample regardless of whether
they have children or not. I do this in part because there is reason to believe that the timing
of pregnancy or motherhood can be susceptible to the policy, and in part because selection
into motherhood itself cannot be properly dealt with using this method. Additionally, if
I wanted to ensure that women had plausibly completed their fertility decisions, I would
have to restrict my sample further by age. Women who were 18 in 2004, when the policy
went into effect, are only 34 years old now. I do not include this restriction in my analysis,
so my results should be interpreted as an average treatment effect.
Figure 4.4 Shows a plot of college enrollment rates by birth year in the period of study
for different states in the US, calculated using the CPS. California is highlighted in red and
a thicker line, while the rest of the states are shown in gray. We can see that the overall
trend of all states is positive, and California remains in the middle of the pack throughout.
Women in California who belong to the 1987 cohort had a college enrollment rate of 0.675.
Figure 2.2 shows the estimated college enrollment rates for the 1987 cohort in each state.
We can see that the state with highest college enrollment rates is DC with 0.834, and the
state with the lowest is Nevada with a rate of 0.517.
2.3.2 Empirical Strategy
The main challenge in evaluating the effects of a policy like this one is that it is hard
to find a geographical group that could serve as a reasonable counterfactual to the state






















Figure 2.1: College Enrollment Trends in California and Other States
the country as a whole may face different dynamics as the same variable in California. As
far as particular states, the choice is not clear: California’s neighboring states could be a
potential choice with the argument that they are subject to similar economic conditions,
but these states are demographically and otherwise different from California. Moreover,
using individuals who live close to the state border, between California and Nevada for
example, is not a good fit for this research question. While these people may be very
similar, endogenous mobility could bias our estimates, especially when one state offers a
benefit that the other does not.
The synthetic control method of Abadie et al. (2010) is well suited for the evaluation of
aggregated policies such as this. The idea behind this approach is to construct a synthetic
California, as a linear combination of untreated states, which will be a good counter factual
for an untreated California. Equation 1 expresses this idea, where Ŷ s is the value of the
outcome variable for the synthetic California in time t, ωi is the weight (between 0 and 1)
chosen for each state i, and Yit is the value of the outcome variable in state i, in time t. In
this notation, states that are untreated include i = 1, 2, ...N − 1 and California is indexed





ω̂iYit ≈ YNt (2.1)
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Figure 2.2: College Enrollment Rates in California and Other States for the 1987 Cohort
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outcome variable itself for several periods before treatment, and uses them to calculate
non-negative weights for every state in the country, such that the weighted average of all
states approximates the pre-policy values of the state of California. This is represented in







ω̂iYit − YNt)2 (2.2)
Once the weights are chosen, a synthetic control is then calculated as the weighted
average of all states, using the optimal weights. This synthetic control is also projected
into the post-policy years, using the same weights. The treatment effect in each period is
estimated as the discrepancy between the synthetic control and what actually occurred in
California, allowing us to calculate dynamic treatment effects. Equation 3 specifies this.
τ̂t = YNt − Ŷ st (2.3)
I apply the synthetic control method to my prepared CPS data. I Take college enrollment
rates from 1975 to 1985 as pre-treatment observations to fit the synthetic control to. As
predictor variables, I use the share of women who report belonging to four racial and ethnic
categories, as well as high school graduation rates, and total household income.
I define treated cohorts as those with imputed birth years after 1987. Those born in
1987 were about 17 years old in 2004, when the policy was implemented and thus more
likely to still be in high school. College enrollment decisions were more likely to be affected
for women who were still in high school at the time of policy implementation. Women who
were older and had previously decided not to enroll in college would likely face higher costs
if they were to return to school.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Main Results
Table 2.1 shows the states for which positive weights were chosen for the synthetic
control for college enrollment. In this case, only Arizona, Hawaii, New Jersey, New Mexico
and Texas were chosen. As Abadie (2019) explains, an attractive property of this method is
that it is transparent in how it builds a synthetic counterfactual. Part of this transparency
is the fact that the number of states with positive weights is small.
Predictor variables are used to choose state-weights. The relative importance of each
predictor variable can be assigned in several ways. In this case, they are chosen propor-
tionally to their variance. These proportions are called v-weights, and they can be found
in Table 2.2.
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Table 2.3 shows the demographic characteristics of California and its synthetic control.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the hardest control to match is the rate of hispanic women in
California. Table 2.2 shows that this predictor variable has a small role in choosing state-
weights.
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Figure 2.3 shows the trends of real and synthetic California for women with imputed
birth years between 1975 and 1990. The dashed vertical line represents the cohort that
was first treated. We can see that the synthetic California follows the trend of California
quite closely before the policy. The divergence between the two Californias after the vertical
dashed line represents the treatment effect. The two lines never cross after treatment, and
the size of the gap remains quite constant for the cohorts shown.
The size of the effect may not seem large, but it represents a persistent treatment effect
of about 2 percentage points. This is quite large considering the indirect nature of the
hypothesized mechanism. After all, the CPFLA only offered about 6 weeks of 60% to
70% of women’s wages, and it would have been difficult to claim for women who were not
eligible for FMLA. This effect is also large considering that enrollment rates in California
were quite high to begin with, at over 65%. Furthermore, this estimate is large if we consider
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Table 2.3: Synthetic Control Balance
Treated Synthetic Sample Mean
Asian 0.136 0.086 0.043
Black 0.060 0.074 0.117
Hispanic 0.418 0.262 0.114
White 0.757 0.750 0.794
High School Diploma 0.856 0.882 0.913
Household Income 67,723.54 67,328.14 61,686.99
it measures effects on human capital investment at the extensive margin. Intensive margin
outcomes would likely show larger effects.
2.4.2 Inference
In order to asses significance, I perform a sequence of placebo tests, following Abadie
et al. (2010). These placebos perform the same exercise described above, but assign treat-
ment to each one of the untreated states.
The next step to assess statistical significance is to calculate the ratio of pre-treatment
RMPSE to post treatment RMSPE for every state, and rank them, following Abadie et al.
(2010). The RMSPE ratio is a way to normalize the estimated treatment effect by the
pre-treatment fit. The larger the ratio, the less likely the true effect is zero. Ranking all
RMSPE ratios allows us to calculate exact p-values. Assessing inference based on these 50
placebo tests is a demanding test of statistical significance.
The histogram of RMSPE ratios is shown in Figure 2.4. As we can see, California’s ratio
is larger than all but one state, and it is quite removed from the rest of the ratios in the
distribution. The p-value of the effect is calculated as the ranking divided by the number
of placebos. In this case, this yields a value of 0.039, which makes my results significant at
the 5% level.
A falsification test of sorts is checking for effects in other variables of interest where we
would not expect an effect. Figure 2.5 shows the synthetic controls exercise for high school
graduation rates. As discussed before, it might be costly for women to adjust some margins
of decision on short notice, given previous investments. This is why I did not expect an
effect on high school graduation rates, and in fact this placebo test shows no effect. Figure
2.5 shows that the trends of California and its synthetic counterfactual follow each other
closely, even after treatment. The high school placebo is also encouraging for the main
results, since it provides evidence that the method is able to predict future trends quite well
15

























Figure 2.3: College Enrollment Rates for California and Synthetic California
in the absence of treatment.
2.4.3 Heterogeneity by Race and Ethnicity
The average effect found in Figure 2.3 may contain substantial heterogeneity. Given the
fact that higher-earning women are more likely to obtain this benefit from their employer,
women who expect to be higher-earning are less likely to be affected by the policy. Thus,
one can expect heterogeneous treatment effects by some characteristics, such as race and
ethnicity, that are related to potential earnings. I therefore construct four strongly balanced
panels from the CPS data that contain state-birthyear averages as before, but for each one
of the following four categories: asian women, black women, hispanic women, and white
women. Hispanic is not mutually exclusive with the other three categories, since hispanic
origin is asked as a separate question from race. These categories don’t include all women
in the CPS, since respondents can select other categories such as Native American, and
multi-racial combinations.
Figures 2.6 through 2.9 show the plots for each one of the ethnic and racial categories.
Most of them have a reasonable pre-trend fit with the exception of college enrollment of
black women, which seems to be very noisy, making it harder to fit by the synthetic control.
The only category that seems to show an effect is that of hispanic women. This suggests

















Figure 2.4: Histogram of RMSPE Ratios
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Figure 2.5: High School Graduation Rates for California and Synthetic California

























Figure 2.6: Synthetic Control: College Enrollment of Asian Women
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Figure 2.7: Synthetic Control: College Enrollment of Black Women























Figure 2.8: Synthetic Control: College Enrollment of Hispanic Women
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Figure 2.9: Synthetic Control: College Enrollment of White Women
that breaking down the data by race and ethnicity may introduce more noise in the trend,
especially in the case of hispanic women outside of California. This could explain why the
synthetic control for this group, in Figure 2.8 is not able to match the smooth California
trend even before treatment.
The synthetic control method has estimated a statistically significant effect of the in-
troduction of CPFLA on women’s college enrollment. The question remains of where this
effect comes from. After all, CPFLA only offered six weeks of partial pay. Only for women
at the very margin would this amount of money be enough to tip the balance in favor of a
college education. I argue that it is likely that women internalized the implementation of
this policy as a reduction in the cost of motherhood on their labor supply. Either because
women expected that workplaces had become more parent-friendly or because society as a
whole was more accommodating for women’s dual role. To formalize the framework for this
mechanism, in the following section I present a simple human capital model.
2.5 Model
Modifying the model from Kuziemko et al. (2018), I characterize women’s optimization
problem as follows. Women live two periods, in which they enjoy consumption and leisure,
and earn a competitive wage (w) for the labor they sell on the market. They must choose
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how much to work on each period, and whether to invest in human capital (schooling) in
the first period. If they choose to do so, they will pay tuition (α) on the first period and
earn a wage premium (δ, per hour worked) in the second period.
For every hour women choose to work in the second period, they must pay mi, mother-
hood costs. Following Kuziemko et al. (2018), I define motherhood costs broadly as any cost
mothers have to incur if they work. An obvious example of this is childcare, but m can also
include psychological costs, decreases in child quality, and others. The motherhood cost
faced by an individual woman comes from an distribution with mean µ. Individual mother-
hood costs include idiosyncratic variation that represents the fact that although some costs
are faced by all, women face different circumstances. Having a network that can provide
childcare, living close to childcare facilities, or family members, etc, would be included in
ρi.













s.t. c1 = wh1 − eα
c2 = c̄+ (w̃ −mi)h2
w̃ =w+δe
mi = µ+ ρi
e ∈ {0, 1}
ρi ∼ iid(0, 1)
In this model, I assume that women know both components of their own motherhood
costs. Because I am looking to rationalize increases in schooling as a result of paid maternity
leave policies, and not changes in women’s labor supply, I abstract from the issue of uncer-
tainty of motherhood costs. In other words, I am interested in the problem that women
are solving when they have to make their schooling decisions, not in the labor outcomes
ex-post.
Women can choose not to work, in which case they would not have to pay motherhood
costs in the second period, but they would also earn no wages. I incorporate non-labor
income in the second period, to account for the income shared by a woman’s partner, al-
though this is not the situation faced by all mothers. In this model, mother’s childcare labor
is unpaid. The model abstracts from several potentially important aspects of motherhood.
For example, I abstract from the endogeneity of fertility.
Given a level of education, women can compute the optimal number of hours they will
supply on the second period. Hence, this problem is easily solved by backward induction.
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There are three possible solutions: 1) women decide not to invest in schooling and not work
in the second period, 2) women decide not to invest in schooling and work in the second
period, and 3) women decide to invest in schooling and work in the second period. Because
there is no uncertainty about the returns to schooling or any other parameter in this model,
there is no optimal case in which women decide to invest in schooling but do not work.
Table 2.4 shows the value function in these three possible cases.
Even though his model does not include the possibility of the phenomenon documented
in Kuziemko et al. (2018) and elsewhere, that women over-invest in education for their
labor supply, my results are consistent with the mechanism argued for in Kuziemko et al.
(2018): women may be taking cues from society (such as maternity leave policies) as a
sign of decreased costs of motherhood, when in fact these costs have increased. In other
words, policies like maternity leave could be exacerbating the systematical underestimation
of motherhood costs.
Table 2.4: Value Functions
(1) No school, no work in t=2 γγ+1w
γ+1
γ + βc̄
(2) No school, work in t=2 γγ+1w
γ+1




(3) School and work in t=2 γγ+1w
γ+1




Given this optimization problem, the question that I ask is how does the choice of
solution change with m? In particular, I am interested in how the schooling choice changes
when women are faced with changes in m. Can an increase in the enrollment rate be the
product of a decrease in µ? I begin with some definitions.
Definition 1: Let m̄a,b be the smallest value of mi that would make a woman indifferent
between cases a and b.





1+γ . The value of m̄2,3 does not have an analytical solution. However,
being able to order the magnitudes of these cutoffs is enough to characterize the way in
which the schooling choice varies with m.
Proposition 1: Out of the eight plausible orderings of m̄1,2, m̄1,3, m̄2,3, only the following
are feasible:
• A: m̄2,3 < m̄1,3 < m̄1,2
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• B: m̄1,2 < m̄1,3 < m̄2,3
• C: m̄1,3 < m̄1,2 < m̄2,3
Cases A, B, and C are shown in Figures 2.10 through 2.12. For a given value of mi,
women would choose to be in the case that has the highest value, so the value function
is the upper contour of the three graphs presented. For our purposes, only cases A and
B are relevant. Case C implies that there is no value of mi for which schooling would be
optimal. In case A, there are values of mi that would make cases 1, 2, or 3 optimal. In this
case, reductions in µ could move women from not working and not acquiring education to
just working or to acquire education as well, depending on the magnitude of the change.
Reductions in µ could also move some women from case 2 to case 3: women who would
have optimized working anyway would now also acquire schooling. I will focus on case A,
since it is more general, and because in reality we observe a non-negative share of women
in all three cases.
Figure 2.10: Case A
Figure 2.13 shows two distributions of motherhood costs under the case A graph of
value functions. Depending on their individual value of ρi, women would make different
decisions, falling in cases 1 through 3, separated by vertical dashed lines, and labeled in
grey. If the mean cost of motherhood decreased, the entire distribution will shift to the left,
as illustrated in the bottom panel. This would move some women from case 1 to case 2, and
from case 2 to case 3. A larger decrease in mu could even move some women from case 1 to
case 3. If we were in the broader case B, where it is never optimal to work without going to
school, women would shift from case 3 to case 1. Therefore, a reduction in µ would increase
the share of women in case 3, which is consistent with the increase in college enrollment
documented in Section 3.
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Figure 2.11: Case B
Figure 2.12: Case C
2.6 Other Evidence
2.6.1 Survey Data: General Social Survey
Section 3 estimates a positive effect of the implementation of CPFLA on women’s college
enrollment. In this section, I present evidence from the General Social Survey (GSS) that
suggests the effect occurs through women internalizing the policy as an expected easing of
the family-work tradeoffs they face.
The General Social Survey has been collected since 1972, currently on a biannual ba-
sis. It contains a large set of questions about opinions held by American adults on topics


























Figure 2.13: Case A With Distribution of Motherhood Costs
For privacy reasons, state markers are not publicly released. I use the regional marker
of Pacific, which includes also other states: Washington, Oregon, Alaska and Hawaii. This
grouping would mechanically reduce the estimated average effect of the policy with a
difference-in-difference estimation. Guided by the heterogeneous effects found in Section
3, and because California has the largest hispanic population of all the states in the Pacific
region of the GSS, I run a triple differences specification with the hispanic marker. The
triple interaction is composed of: 1) being interviewed before or after the implementation of
the policy (2004), 2) living in the Pacific region at the age or 16 or elsewhere in the US, and
3) identifying as hispanic. This triple interaction is more likely to identify the effects of the
policy, since most hispanic women in the Pacific region are in the state of California, and
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results in Section 3 suggest hispanic women are more likely to be affected within California.
In this specification, treatment is not defined by the year of birth, but rather the year
of interview. This is to identify young women’s beliefs before and after the policy came to
effect, to see if their beliefs are changed by their awareness of the policy or their exposure to
it, regardless of their age. In the sample I include only women who were 25 or younger at the
time of interview, to minimize the possibility of the effect motherhood itself or experience
in the workplace confound the effect (as in Kuziemko et al. (2018)). Still, I control for
whether the respondent has children, as well as some other demographic characteristics.
Table 2.5 shows the results of this specification for some variables related to women’s
dual roles as mothers and workers. Column 1 shows the estimated effect of the policy on
how rarely women perceive work interfering with family life. Results show that the average
effect of the policy on hispanic women is positive ans statistically significant. This means
that hispanic women in the Pacific region report work interfering with family life to happen
less frequently (more rarely) after the policy.
Column 2 finds no effect on how much women agree with the statement that family life
suffers as a result of mothers working. This suggests that the motherhood side of the tradeoff
was not worsened as a result of the policy. The same holds for Column 3, which estimates
the effect on beliefs about preschoolers suffering when their mothers go to work. However,
Column 4 estimates that women are more likely to believe that working women can have
a warm relationship with their children. This effect is different for hispanic women in the
Pacific region than for other women in the region. The total effect estimated for hispanic
women is still estimated negative and statistically significant. This result is also consistent
with the hypothesis of a perceived decrease on the cost of motherhood that is larger for
hispanic women.
Finally, Column 5 estimates a positive difference-in-differences coefficient for disagreeing
with the following statement: “A job is alright, but what most women really want is a home
and children.” The triple differences coefficient is not statistically significant, albeit also
having a positive sign.
Overall, the triple differences estimations presented in this section are consistent with
the mechanism rationalized in the model of Section 4. It is plausible that the effect found
in Section 3 is driven by a reduction in the perceived cost of motherhood on labor supply.
Women, especially hispanic women, as I find evidence that their opinions on topics related
to the motherhood-work tradeoff. However, the evidence presented in this section should be
interpreted with caution as this specific data set does not allow us to separate women living
in California from other women in the Pacific region. Even though the hispanic marker may
assist us in this analysis, the structure of the data is not ideal to answer these questions,
and results in a small sample.
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Table 2.5: Triple Differences Estimation on Variables of Women’s Roles
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
How rarely Disagree: Family Disagree: Disagree: Disagree: Most
does Work Life Suffers Preschoolers Working Moms Women Really
Interfere if Mother Will Suffer Can Be Want Home
With Family Works FT Mom Works Warm and Kids
DDD 2.402*** 1.445 -0.494 -2.624** 0.151
(0.771) (1.655) (1.267) (1.021) (1.141)
DD -0.316 -0.348 -0.055 1.006** 1.319***
(0.600) (1.203) (0.807) (0.460) (0.487)
TE Hispanic 2.185*** 1.1222 -0.557 -1.606* 1.444
(0.593) (1.167) (1.014) (0.881) (1.040)
H X A -1.410*** -0.020 0.581 1.481** 0.076
(0.504) (0.745) (0.721) (0.734) (0.562)
Hispanic N 23 23 23 23 23
N 91 149 148 148 147
Notes: standard errors in parentheses. Controls include number of children, time trend, racial
categories, number of adults in the household, mother’s education and having a working mother
growing up. Sample includes female participants between 18 and 25 years of age.
2.6.2 Google Trends
When estimating policy effects, it is common to question how much were eligible par-
ticipants actually aware of the existence of these benefits. If the effect of this policy is
indeed through women internalizing a decrease in family-work tradeoffs, it is not necessary
that women are aware of the policy details and eligibility rules. A general message being
spread would be sufficient, especially if youger women were exposed to it. For example,
having more conversations around the topic of maternity leave, and becoming aware of the
existence of paid leave could be enough for women to internalize the message.
In order to investigate whether there was interest around maternity leave happening
around the time of the policy implementation in California, I use Google Trends data.
Google Trends analyzes google web searches and computes an index of relative interest in
the specified search terms over a determined period of time. The index takes a value of 100
when the number of searches was the maximum over the specified period of time, and a
value of zero when there were none. This index measures interest in the search term over
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time, in a specific region.
Google Trends time series begin in January 2004, which means there is not much data
on the time before the CPFLA began, in August 2004. However, by looking at the trends
starting in January 2004 and comparing different geographical regions, we can get a sense
of the relative trends in the conversations or topics that people were reading about.
To eliminate the noise in google trends data, I apply an HP filter to each series. This
allows me to extract the underlying trend of the data. This is especially important since,
perhaps unsurprisingly, the data is more volatile at the beginning of the series.
Figures 2.14 through 2.16 present the filtered series for different combinations of words
related to CPFLA. The solid line represents the HP-filtered index for google searches of that
combination of words in the entire United States, while the dashed line is the equivalent
but only for searches in the state of California.
In Figure 2.14, we can see that there is a peak in interest in the words “working moms”
for the state of California around 2005, close to when the policy began effect (August 2004).
The pattern of interest in the United States looks remarkably different. It increases steadily
before somewhat flattening around 2015. The difference in trends supports the idea that
the topic gained relevance in public discourse in California around the time of the policy
implementation. This combination of words is not policy-specific, but rather related to the
content of the policy, which suggests that there was public discussion and interest around
the topic of women’s dual role as workers and mothers, not just about the specific legislation
in question.
Figure 2.15 shows the HP-filtered index for the word combination “Paid Maternity Leave
California,” which is more specific to the CPFLA. The patterns of the state of California and
the US don’t look that different in this case, but because the word “California” is included in
the search criteria, this is not surprising. The fact that interest peaks in 2004 and gradually
decreases until after 2010 is encouraging for the hypothesis that policy implementation in
fact generated interest in the topic.
Finally, Figure2.16 shows the HP-filtered index for the words “Paid Maternity Leave”.
Patterns differ strikingly between the US and the state of California. These patterns re-
semble those in 2.14, but are more directly related to CPFLA. What this plot shows is
that the pattern of interest in this combination of words in the state of California had a
peak around early 2005, decreased and started to gradually increase after around 2011. On
the other hand, the entire country had a constant interest at first, and built up interest
for this combination of words beginning around 2011. The fact that interest in California
peaks around policy implementation, while interest in the rest of the country behaves very
differently supports the idea that these issues were being locally discussed.



























Figure 2.14: Filtered Google Search Index: “Working Mom”
message to seep into attitudes and gain interest in public discussion. The results shown in
this section suggest that the policy had some implications in attitudes and public discourse,
even if individuals were unaware of the specifics of the policy. Conversations around ma-
ternity leave caused by the implementation of the CPFLA may have influenced women’s
perceptions of work-motherhood tradeoffs, ultimately modifying their human capital invest-
ment decisions.
2.7 Conclusions
I find that the CPFLA induced a statistically significant increase in female college en-
rollment of roughly 2 percentage points that is persistent. This effect is consistent with
women internalizing maternity leave policies as a decrease in the cost of motherhood on
their labor supply. This chapter argues that women’s expectation of the effects of a policy
are enough to drive behavior change (in particular, schooling choices) even if ex-post effects
are not what they anticipated. I provide evidence that interest in these topics was generated
around the time when the policy was implemented, and that attitudes around the topics
were also affected.
I contribute to the literature of effects of maternity leave policy by studying women’s
changes in schooling decisions. Furthermore, my results provide more evidence of the fact
that women’s labor supply seems to be constrained by the work-family tradeoffs they face,


















































Figure 2.16: Filtered Google Search Index: “Paid Maternity Leave ”
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replacement policy. As discussed before, job protection policies were already in place,
albeit not accessible to all women. In this sense, the effect found cannot be generalized as
an effect of all maternity leave policies. With this data I cannot study how eligibility rules
played into the effects I find, but these are potentially important insights, especially for
policy makers.
In light of other research finding that the gender gap in labor-market outcomes is stag-
nant while women’s schooling keeps increasing, policymakers and researchers should pay
more attention to the broad effects of these policies. Women seem to take maternity leave
as a sign of a decrease in the cost of motherhood, and increase schooling in anticipation of
higher future labor supply. If paid maternity leave policies don’t ease these tradeoffs, or
aren’t accompanied by such an effect, this may result in women underestimating the cost
of motherhood on their labor supply. Statements about the welfare effects of these policies
may have to take this into consideration.
More research is needed on the relationship between maternity leave policies, women’s
expectations of their effects, and the ex-post effects on women’s labor-market and related
outcomes. In particular, studying the relationship between expectations and the ex-post
limiting factors that contribute to persistent gender gaps in labor-market outcomes. It is
also important to study how endogenous fertility plays into these mechanisms.
Another choice that these policies could be affecting is that of occupation. Future
research should study how these policies may shift women from one occupation (or one
college major) to another, and how that could be impacting the gender-wage gap, which
has been documented to be related to occupational choices.
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Chapter 3
You Know What I Know:
Interviewer Knowledge Effects in
Subjective Expectation Elicitation
3.1 Introduction
Demographic research has increasingly made use of individuals’ subjective expectations
about probabilities and the distributions of variables. Such subjective expectations are im-
portant drivers of demographic phenomena such as fertility (Delavande, 2008; Mac Dougall
et al., 2013; Shapira, 2017) and migration (McKenzie et al., 2013; Shrestha, 2020), and
can help us understand their trends and underlying determinants. Furthermore, subjective
expectations are related to objective probabilities and can be used to help forecast future
trends, for example in the case of mortality rates (Perozek, 2008).
However, the face-to-face surveys commonly used to measure subjective beliefs in de-
veloping countries have a potential weakness: respondents’ recorded beliefs may be affected
by what interviewers know about the phenomenon in question. These surveys sometimes
measure subjective beliefs by asking about percent chances directly (Hurd and McGarry,
1995; Lillard and Willis, 2001; McKenzie et al., 2006), but often use visual aids (Attana-
sio et al., 2005; Delavande and Kohler, 2009; Delavande et al., 2011b) or ask how many
of a fixed number of people would have something happen to them (Aguila et al., 2014;
de Mel et al., 2008). All three approaches rely heavily on the interviewer to explain the
question and encourage the respondent to give a valid answer. These interviewer-subject
interactions raise the specter of interviewer effects, and in particular the possibility that
interviewer knowledge could inadvertently spill over onto subjects’ recorded beliefs.
The effect of interviewer characteristics on survey responses has been documented across
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a wide range of contexts. Examples of these characteristics are race and ethnicity (Cotter
et al., 1982; Reese et al., 1986; Anderson et al., 1988; Finkel et al., 1991; Davis, 1997; Dionne,
2014; Adida et al., 2016), religion (Blaydes and Gillum, 2013), gender (Becker et al., 1995;
McCombie and Anarfi, 2002), and social or cultural proximity (Weinreb, 2006). Respon-
dents may also infer the purpose of the study from interviewers and change their answers
as a result, a pattern known as experimenter demand effects (Orne, 1962; Zizzo, 2010; de
Quidt et al., 2018). This body of research shows the importance of social interactions in the
interview setting for recorded survey responses, and how interviewer characteristics may
impact this interaction. An extensive literature has also explored the methodology of sub-
jective belief elicitation (Delavande, 2014). However, to our knowledge, no previous paper
has studied the role of interviewer knowledge in driving survey responses.
Leveraging a randomized experiment that used interviewers to implement an informa-
tion treatment, we show that interviewer knowledge has an effect on respondents’ recorded
beliefs. The experiment was designed to investigate how information about the true trans-
mission rate of HIV affects risk-taking (Kerwin, 2020). Interviewers were taught the true
HIV transmission rate mid-way through the baseline survey, in order to conduct the in-
formation treatments for the study. The study respondents were randomly divided into
control surveys, which happened before the interviewers learned the information, and treat-
ment surveys, which happened afterwards. We use data from the baseline surveys, when
treatment-group respondents had not yet been taught the risk information themselves, but
were interviewed by people who had been taught it.
Interviewer knowledge matters for recorded risk perceptions. Comparing the baseline
surveys across study arms, we find that interviewers who were exposed to the information
treatment elicit lower HIV transmission rate perceptions from respondents. Reported beliefs
are significantly shifted by the interviewers’ knowledge, decreasing by about nine percentage
points, or roughly 0.3 SD of the control-group belief distribution. This finding can help
explain the puzzling finding that people’s preferences and beliefs appear to be very unstable
in panel surveys (Chuang and Schechter, 2015; Mueller et al., 2019). If recorded responses
are heavily shaped by interviewers’ knowledge and beliefs, then people’s answers may appear
to be much more unstable than they really are.
In addition to shedding light on the role of interviewer knowledge in driving survey
responses, our study also builds on the previous literature on interviewer effects by iso-
lating the causal effect of a specific interviewer characteristic—knowledge. Past studies of
interviewer effects have been able to exploit the exogenous assignment of interviewers to
respondents, but have been limited by the fact that the interviewer characteristics in ques-
tion are both fixed and correlated with other attributes. For example, race is correlated
with income and socioeconomic status, and a wide range of interviewer characteristics can
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all affect responses simultaneously (Di Maio and Fiala, 2019). Because interviewers in our
study were exogenously shocked with new information about HIV transmission rates, we
can isolate the causal effect of knowledge alone. This is the first study we are aware of
that has been able to identify the causal effect of a single interviewer characteristic. This
is possible because knowledge, unlike the other characteristics that are typically studied,
is malleable: it can be changed quickly, whereas even many non-fixed traits like education
levels can be changed only slowly, and others such as age cannot be changed at all.
We can identify several channels through which interviewers’ knowledge affects recorded
risk perceptions. First, interviewers who underwent the training primed respondents to give
answers that match the exact training content. The training explained that the annual
transmission rate of HIV between an HIV-positive spouse and an HIV-negative spouse who
have regular unprotected sex is 10%. Consistent with a priming story, treatment-group
respondents are 4.3 percentage points more likely to (incorrectly) report that the per-act
probability of HIV transmission is exactly 10%.
A related mechanism by which interviewer knowledge affects recorded risk perceptions
is through nudging respondents to give lower answers. Evidence for this comes from an
aspect of the survey design: if a respondent answered exactly 50% for any risk perception
question, interviewers were taught to follow up and see if they were simply unsure; if so,
they were asked for their best guess, following Hudomiet et al. (2011). Interviewers who
underwent the training were less likely to elicit higher numbers when they ask respondents
to provide a best guess in this situation. This suggests that interviewers who have been
exposed to the information treatment are nudging participants away from higher answers.
The same pattern could also affect the initial responses to the questions.
The strength of respondents’ priors may affect how much interviewer knowledge matters.
The effect of interviewer training is smaller for more educated respondents, and falls to zero
for respondents who reached at least Form 2 (10th grade) in school. This may be due to the
fact that students in Malawi learn about HIV transmission during Form 2, and are exposed
to a narrative that claims HIV is highly contagious. While the information taught during
Form 2 diffuses through the population as a whole, more-educated respondents are exposed
to it directly, and thus likely feel more certain about their beliefs. This makes them less
susceptible to the interviewer’s nudges to report lower risk beliefs.
We suggest several ways to correct for interviewer knowledge effects. Interviewer re-
cruitment for face-to-face surveys should try to match the population of respondents, and
interviewer training should emphasize the possibility of unintentional spillovers and the need
to treat all respondents consistently. When designing information experiments, researchers
should consider running baseline surveys simultaneously across groups or separating the
information treatment from surveys, although these approaches have their own drawbacks.
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Even when no information is provided, knowledge spillovers remain likely—interviewers can
vary widely in their knowledge and beliefs, and so teaching them about topics relevant to
the survey may improve data quality. One promising avenue is to eliminate the interaction
between interviewer and respondent by performing surveys via audio computer assisted self
interviewing (ACASI) which can work even in contexts with low literacy and numeracy.
However, ACASI may lead to lower data quality than face-to-face interviews; further work
in this area would be invaluable.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 reviews the role of subjective
beliefs in demography, provides background on Malawi’s HIV epidemic, and describes the
previous literature on subjective expectations about HIV in Malawi. Section 2 describes
the experiment and the data, and Section 3 presents the empirical strategy we use to
evaluate interviewer knowledge effects. Section 4 shows how interviewer knowledge affects
measurements of respondents’ subjective expectations. In Section 5 we explore mechanisms
for the effects, and in Section 6 we discuss potential corrections for interviewer knowledge
effects. Section 7 concludes.
3.2 Background
3.2.1 Subjective Expectations and Demographic Decisions
Subjective expectations play a key role in driving demographic patterns and people’s re-
sponses to them. They drive contraception choices and fertility (Delavande, 2008; Mac Dougall
et al., 2013; Shapira, 2017) as well as migration (McKenzie et al., 2013; Shrestha, 2020).
Perceived mortality risks affect whether people engage in life-threatening activities—see e.g.
Delavande and Kohler (2016) for HIV, León and Miguel (2017) for transportation choices,
and Bennear et al. (2013) and Keskin et al. (2016) for water safety—and thus actual mor-
tality rates. The effects of subjective expectations often spill over between demographic
choices and other domains. For example, women’s education and career decisions depend
on their beliefs about the costs of raising children—which can differ sharply from real-
ity (Kuziemko et al., 2018). Similarly, women tend to systematically underestimate their
fecundity at young ages and overestimate it at older ages (Mahony, 2011).1
1In addition to uncertainty about their material circumstances, people may also be uncertain about their
own futures or the correct course of action; periods of uncertainty can cause intersections between aspects of
people’s lives that usually seem separate, such as work and romantic relationships (Johnson-Hanks, 2017).
This uncertainty about the correct course of action is itself shaped by uncertainty about material facts, such
as the risks of mortality and miscarriage (Trinitapoli and Yeatman, 2018).
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Data on people’s subjective expectations are also a potentially-useful tool for demogra-
phy research. Subjective mortality probabilities may be useful predictors of actual mortal-
ity rates (Perozek, 2008) and are correlated with known predictors of mortality (Delavande
et al., 2017), although there is also evidence that people’s subjective mortality beliefs have
systematic biases (Elder, 2013). Despite their limitations, subjective mortality beliefs may
still be valuable: people form them using risk factors such as parental health and longevity
that objective mortality rates cannot account for, and they affect risk-taking behaviors (Dor-
mont et al., 2018). Similarly, self-rated health is a useful predictor of mortality (Burström
and Fredlund, 2001). Subjective beliefs about health can help forecast future mortality
rates: they are available earlier than objective predictors of mortality, and they predict
mortality even conditional on objective measures of health status (Idler and Benyamini,
1997).
There is a crucial distinction between individuals’ subjective expectations about risks
and other variables and the true values of these figures. Much social science research
assumes that people know the true values of numbers, but recent research has focused on
measuring people’s actual perceptions, which can be quite different from the truth (Manski,
2004). Consider the case of subjective expectations about mortality rates. These can differ
from true population-average mortality rates in three key ways (Delavande and Rohwedder,
2011). First, they measure a variable that has not yet been observed because the population
answering the survey questions is still alive. Second, they may be measured with error
relative to the person’s true beliefs. Third, they reflect individuals’ beliefs about what will
happen, rather than the truth.
3.2.2 The HIV Epidemic in Malawi
Malawi has been dealing with a severe HIV epidemic for several decades and the disease
has had major effects on its population. The prevalence of the virus has been stable at
around 10% of the population for roughly the past decade (National Statistical Office -
NSO/Malawi and ICF, 2017).2 The expansion of access to antiretroviral treatment (ART)
for HIV has drastically improved the situation for HIV-positive people in recent years.
Starting in 2016, Malawi implemented a universal test-and-treat policy, so that all HIV-
positive people had access to ART (Alhaj et al., 2019). Testing rates are still low for men,
but most women get access to treatment because there is strong pressure to accept the
nominally-voluntary HIV tests during antenatal care visits (Angotti et al., 2011).3 Even
2A small apparent drop (to a prevalence of 9%) in the 2015 DHS was the result of a change in method-
ology; measured on a consistent basis, the prevalence was essentially unchanged from the 2011 survey.
3This is part of a systematic pattern of HIV prevention efforts targeting women and excluding men
(Watkins, 2011).
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with the expansion of access to treatment, however, HIV is still a major issue in people’s
lives.
The large scale of Malawi’s HIV epidemic has led to extensive research by social scientists
on how it impacts people’s lives. Most prominently, this includes the Malawi Longitudinal
Study of Families and Health (MLSFH), which has been collecting demographic, socioeco-
nomic, and health information on the same households since 1998. The MLSFH also embeds
a novel ethnographic study, the Malawi Journals Project (MJP), in which Malawians record
everyday conversations about HIV/AIDS.
3.2.3 Subjective Expectations About HIV in Malawi
An important focus of research on HIV in Malawi has been on measuring people’s sub-
jective beliefs about the disease and understanding how those beliefs affect their behavior.
The MLSFH measures both people’s perceptions about HIV and their sexual activity, and
has an embedded experiment in which respondents were incentivized to learn their HIV sta-
tus (Fedor et al., 2015; Thornton, 2008). It was also used as a platform to design and study
an innovative technique for capturing subjective probabilities using visual aids (Delavande
and Kohler, 2009). This work was an important contribution to a literature that shows
that eliciting subjective probability beliefs is feasible in low and middle-income settings
(Attanasio, 2009; Delavande, 2014; Delavande et al., 2011a).
A core finding of the work on subjective beliefs about HIV in Malawi is that people sub-
stantially over-estimate their likelihood of being HIV-positive (Bignami-Van Assche et al.,
2007; Anglewicz and Kohler, 2009). Relatedly, they also over-estimate the transmission rate
of the virus by several orders of magnitude (Delavande and Kohler, 2016; Kerwin, 2020).
Extensive research has tried to understand how people form these beliefs. One channel is
through HIV testing: Malawians who learn they are HIV-positive lower their beliefs about
the transmission rate of the virus (Delavande and Kohler, 2012); this may be because they
realize they have not yet transmitted the virus to their sex partners. Qualitative evidence
from the MJP supports this quantitative finding. Kaler and Watkins (2010) found that
people are ambivalent about testing: they think that it will always lead to a positive result,
followed by death. They also found that as a result of thinking that HIV tests mostly turn
out positive, people overestimate the transmission rate of HIV.
Information from HIV tests spreads beyond the person being tested. Spouses typically
tell each other about their HIV test results, although HIV-positive women are less likely to
share their status (Anglewicz and Chintsanya, 2011). More broadly, subjective expectations
about HIV risks spread through social networks (Helleringer and Kohler, 2005; Kohler
et al., 2007). People also draw inferences about HIV risks from their own experiences.
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For example, when young women marry, they are more likely to think they are at risk of
contracting HIV in the future—possibly because they know or suspect their husbands are
unfaithful (Grant and Soler-Hampejsek, 2014).
Another line of research has shown that subjective expectations about HIV matter:
people respond to their perceived risks of being HIV-positive. It is perceived, rather than
actual, HIV status that drives condom use for women, even when one’s actual status is
known (Anglewicz and Clark, 2013). Ethnographic evidence from the MJP shows a similar
pattern for men. They assume they are HIV-positive even with no medical evaluation or
signs of AIDS, which drives further risky behavior (Kaler, 2003; Kaler et al., 2015). Many
people are uncertain about their HIV status, and this uncertainty affects their fertility
intentions (Trinitapoli and Yeatman, 2011).
In addition to changing their behavior in response to their perceived HIV status, peo-
ple also respond to their perceived chance of contracting the disease. (Grant and Soler-
Hampejsek, 2014) show that women may use divorce to protect themselves if they believe
they are at high risk of contracting HIV, mirroring the finding by Anglewicz and Reniers
(2014) that HIV-positive people have higher rates of widowhood and divorce. Women who
anticipate that they will contract HIV in the future invest more in their children’s education
(Grant, 2008). The causal effect of risk perceptions on behavior also holds for probabilistic
beliefs of the kind studied in this paper (Delavande and Kohler, 2016; Kerwin, 2020).
3.3 Data and Empirical Design
We use data from an experiment designed to study the effects of risk perceptions on
risk-taking behavior (Kerwin, 2020) that was conducted in the Zomba District of Malawi
from August to December 2012. The experiment randomly assigned one-half of respondents
(stratified by distance to the trading center and gender) to receive information about HIV
transmission risks at the end of the baseline survey. Treatment-group participants were read
an information script that explained the actual HIV transmission rate for couples with one
infected partner that have regular unprotected sex (about 100 times per year, on average).
The true transmission rate is 10% per year (Wawer et al., 2005), far below what Malawians
typically believe. In our sample, the average risk belief is about 90% per year, and nearly
one-half of our sample thinks that the transmission rate from just a single exposure is 100%.
The risk information was provided by the survey interviewers, using a script and a set of
visual aids that were built into the treatment-group surveys. The interviewers themselves
were taught the risk information and how to conduct that survey module via a two-day
training session that took place halfway through the baseline data collection. All the control-
group surveys were scheduled to occur before this training session to minimize the risk of
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contaminating the control villages, following Godlonton et al. (2015).4
The interviewers seem to have been unaware of the actual HIV transmission rate prior
to the training session, and thus it likely strongly shifted their beliefs about HIV risks.
Although we lack direct data on their beliefs prior to the information session, two sources
of evidence support this claim. First, the interviewers all lived in or close to the study area,
so the pre-training data for the control group is a reasonable proxy for their beliefs. Less
than 2% of our control group thought the annual risk of HIV transmission was below 20% at
baseline. A second piece of evidence comes from the training session itself. The interviewers
expressed surprise at the information they were taught, and many were initially reluctant
to believe it. To help convince them, project staff had to show them the original research
study (Wawer et al., 2005) as well as the section of the Malawi National AIDS Commission
website that listed the HIV transmission rate.
The fact that the interviewers were taught new information just before they started to
survey the randomly assigned treatment group allows us to study how that information
affected survey responses. We use the interviewer training session as a treatment and study
how that changes the recorded baseline beliefs of respondents. Comparing the baseline be-
liefs between the treatment and control groups allows us to estimate the effect of interviewer
knowledge on recorded risk beliefs.
Our principal outcome measure is respondents’ recorded subjective risk beliefs on the
baseline surveys. This variable was collected by asking respondents to estimate proportions
of a fixed number of people—for example, “If 100 men, who do not have HIV, each have sex
with a woman who is HIV-positive tonight and do not use a condom, how many of them do
you think will have HIV after the night?” The questions cover transmission rates per act
and per year for both protected and unprotected sex. Respondents picked integers between
0 and 100 in response to each question.1noteFor the per-year question about unprotected
sex, the correct answer is 10; for the per-act equivalent, the closest possible answer to the
truth is 0. In the absence of condom failures, the correct answer for both the per-year and
per-act condom-protected sex questions is 0. This style of question to assess expectations
has also been tested and validated by previous research in Malawi (Chinkhumba et al.,
2014; Godlonton et al., 2015; Kerwin et al., 2011).5 Interviewers had no incentive to record
specific answers to this question but instead were incentivized to record answers accurately:
4There were a handful of control surveys that did take place after the training session. These were
cleanup surveys that happened because selected respondents were not available at the time of the scheduled
baseline interview, and had to be interviewed afterwards.
5These questions measure the respondents’ perceived risk of contracting HIV from various sexual be-
haviors, not their perceived probability of currently being HIV positive. Our measured probabilities are
comparable to other measurements from Malawi. For example, Delavande and Kohler (2012) found a mean
per-act risk for unprotected sex of 87%, compared with 83% in our data.
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random back-checks were used to check that surveys were actually conducted and responses
were recorded correctly.
Our sample of respondents includes 1,292 individuals from 70 villages who have both
valid baseline and endline survey data. The two study arms were balanced on observable
exogenous variables. The experiment we use was not designed to study the interviewers,
and so we have very limited data on their characteristics based on administrative records.
Of the 14 interviewers in our sample, half are female and half male. The even gender
split was chosen intentionally to facilitate gender-matched interviews: all male respondents
were interviewed by men, and all women were interviewed by women. All interviewers had
completed secondary school (a screening requirement imposed during hiring), and most had
graduated recently (and thus they were in their 20s). They were recruited from the local
area but were not assigned to survey anyone they knew personally.
3.4 Empirical Strategy
To study the effect of interviewer knowledge on respondents’ recorded risk beliefs, we
compare the recorded baseline beliefs of the treatment and control groups. Our main
regression specification is Eq. (3.1), where Yi is either a measure of risk beliefs at baseline
or an indicator variable for specific values of the risk belief at baseline. The dummy variable
Ti takes a value of 1 for respondents in the treatment group and 0 otherwise. Our treatment
is thus defined as having been interviewed at baseline by a more-knowledgeable interviewer.
We control for sampling strata fixed effects, Zi, and interviewer fixed effects, Ii; the latter
allow us to rule out the possibility that interviewer characteristics other than knowledge
are driving our results. We also control for Wi, a sexual activity index based on the first
five variables in the balance table (see the section Alternative Explanations for further
discussion). All standard errors are adjusted for clustering by village.




iγ + δWi + εi. (3.1)
To understand the mechanisms behind the effects, we interact the treatment indicator with
respondent characteristics (Eq. (3.2)). We de-mean all covariates before interacting them
with the treatment indicator, so the main effect of the treatment can still be interpreted as
the sample-average treatment effect (Imbens and Rubin, 2015, p. 247).
Yi = α+ βTi + γTi ×Xi + δXi + Z ′iη + I ′iγ + δWi+ εi. (3.2)
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Figure 3.1: Measured Risk Beliefs over Time, by Study Arm
Notes: Sample includes 1,292 sexually-active adults who were successfully interviewed at
both baseline and endline. Risk beliefs are the perceived probability of contracting HIV
from a single unproteted sex act with an infected partner. Each point represents the mean
value of the risk beliefs for a given day; baseline control beliefs are hollow circles, endline
control beliefs are solid circles, baseline treatment beliefs are hollow triangles, and endline
treatment beliefs are solid triangles. The lines are linear fits of beliefs on date for a given
date range and study arm. The dashed vertical line indicates the date of the training
sessions when the survey interviewers were trained to provide the information treatment
about HIV transmission risks.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Main Estimates
Interviewers exposed to the information treatment elicit lower risk perceptions. Figure
3.1 shows the daily average recorded risk beliefs for the treatment and control groups over
time. The first group of observations represents the control-group beliefs at baseline, when
neither the interviewers nor the respondents knew the content of the information treatment.
After those surveys were complete, the interviewers learned the content of the information
treatment (vertical dashed line) and then conducted the baseline treatment surveys. We
can see that risk beliefs of the treatment group are lower than those of the control group.
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There are five days with control-group baseline data after the information treatment.
These are cleanup baseline surveys for the control group that were conducted after the bulk
of the baseline control-group surveys were finished and that took place after the interviewer
training session. This happened when respondents were not available at the initially sched-
uled baseline interview. The distribution of beliefs for these observations is closer to that
of the treatment group than to the rest of the control group, lending support to the idea
that interviewer knowledge specifically–and not some other factor that is imbalanced across
study arms–is causing the mean difference between baseline treatment and control recorded
beliefs.
Further support for the idea that the change in beliefs is due to interviewer knowledge
is evident in the endline risk beliefs. First, the endline risk beliefs allow us to reject the
possibility that the treatment group simply accidentally received the risk information prior
to answering their baseline survey questions. The direct information treatment effect on risk
beliefs (the gap between the endline risk beliefs for the treatment and the control groups)
is much larger than the treatment-control difference at baseline.
Second, the control-group endline beliefs are very similar to the treatment-group baseline
beliefs, which is completely consistent with a model in which recorded beliefs are moved
by interviewer knowledge. Neither the treatment group at baseline nor the control group
at endline had been directly told the information about HIV transmission risks, but both
were interviewed by interviewers who did know the information. As a result, both sets of
risk beliefs are shifted downward relative to the control-group baseline beliefs, and they also
have similar average values to one another.
Table 3.1 presents our main results numerically. Each column represents a measure of a
different HIV transmission risk: measured per act or per year, and when using condoms or
having unprotected sex. For all four measured risk beliefs, the coefficient on the treatment
(interviewer training) is negative and significant. In the case of the per-act transmission
risk for unprotected sex, the coefficient is 9.3 percentage points, or about 0.3 standard
deviations. The magnitude of the effect is relatively large, especially considering that it
is an unintentional spillover: respondents were not directly exposed to the information
treatment. As shown in Figure 3.1, the effect at endline, when participants themselves were
exposed to the information treatment, was larger: 38.4 percentage points for the perceived
per-act transmission risk for unprotected sex.
Participants in the control group had average risk beliefs that were substantially larger
than the true risk of HIV transmission in each one of those cases. For example, the true
value of the per-year transmission rate for unprotected sex is about 10% (Wawer et al.,
2005), but the average respondent in the control group thought the risk was 83%, and well
over one-half of respondents thought the risk was 100%. Baseline beliefs for the control
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Table 3.1: Effects of interviewer knowledge on reported risk beliefs
(1) (2) (3) (4)









Treatment -0.0745*** -0.0352*** -0.0366*** -0.0850***
(0.0191) (0.0128) (0.0128) (0.0157)
Control-group mean 0.827 0.927 0.123 0.236
Control-group SD 0.264 0.169 0.218 0.279
Observations 1,282 1,277 1,284 1,277
Notes: All regressions control for stratification cell and interviewer fixed effects. Sam-
ple includes 1,292 sexually-active adults who were successfully interviewed at both
baseline and endline. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered by village,
in parentheses: ∗p < 0.1; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
group have the correct ordering in terms of which risk is higher, but all the average levels
are higher than the true infection risks.
Interviewer training decreased recorded risk beliefs for all four measures, even though
the training discussed only the per-year risk for unprotected sex, shown in column 2 of Table
3.1. Column 1 shows an effect of 9.3 percentage points (0.35 SD); columns 2 and 4 show
effects of 4.8 and 7.9 percentage points, respectively (0.28 SD each). Column 3 shows the
smallest effect, at 2.7 percentage points (0.12 SD), corresponding to the per-act, condom-
protected transmission risk.6 This variable has the lowest control-group mean overall, so a
smaller effect is not surprising, and we can still reject a zero treatment effect. Moreover, the
risks of condom-protected sex are simply scaled-down versions of the risks from unprotected
sex, so changes in those variables should be smaller.
The fact that interviewer knowledge changes responses for risk beliefs that were not
explicitly targeted suggests that interviewers internalized the information and actually
changed their beliefs about transmission risk, as opposed to memorizing the one figure
that was presented to them. Interviewers knew that the four measures of transmission risk
were related, and when they adjusted their beliefs for one, it affected their beliefs for all
the others. Thus the threat of interviewer knowledge effects appears to be quite general:
6The results in Table 1 are qualitatively identical if we omit the sexual activity index or the interviewer
fixed effects from the controls.
43
knowledge spillovers occur not only with directly provided information but also with the
implications of the information.
3.5.2 Alternative Explanations
Interviewer Experience
Another potential explanation for our findings is interviewer experience. The trajectory
of the pretreatment trend in the first portion of Figure 3.1, if extended, would intersect
the level of recorded risk beliefs in the second portion. This could have happened if inter-
viewers improved over time at asking the relatively complicated questions on the subjective
expectation module. Our basic results in Table 1 do not rule out the possibility that the
estimated treatment effects are due to interviewer experience alone.
To examine this possibility in further detail, we present a set of regression discontinuity
(RD) plots in Figure 3.2. These graphs are produced using the (Calonico et al., 2015)
rdplot Stata command to automatically bin the data and fit polynomial curves on either
side of the discontinuity. The binned averages are shown using dark gray dots, with black
lines for the polynomial fits. The light gray regions show 95% confidence intervals for the
bin-specific averages.
We also show the estimated treatment effects from RD models in Table 3.2, using the
rdrobust Stata command (Calonico et al., 2017). This command automatically selects
data-driven bandwidths and computes robust bias-corrected p values (Calonico et al., 2014).
Panel a of Figure 3.2 shows the main comparison of interest: before versus after the
training session, per-act HIV transmission risk beliefs for unprotected sex. Two conclusions
are clear from the graph. First, the steep downward trend apparent in the first portion
of Figure 3.1 is partly an artifact of fitting a linear trend to daily average risk beliefs as
opposed to the underlying survey data. Fitting a flexible polynomial to the actual survey
responses reveals a slight downward trend to the left of the discontinuity. There is some
evidence for interviewer experience driving a downward trend in responses, but the pattern
is not particularly strong.
Second, even accounting for trends in responses due to interviewer experience, we see
a sharp jump in responses right at the time of the intervention. The polynomial fits differ
by more than 10 percentage points, and the bin-average confidence intervals barely overlap.
The numerical results (column 1 of Table 3.2, panel A) show that this jump is statistically
significant: the RD estimate of the treatment effect is 15 percentage points, with a p value
of .03.
Another way of assessing the role of interviewer experience is to compare the results
with another complex survey module. The questions about sexual activity in the past week
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Figure 3.2: Regression discontinuity plots
(a) HIV Transmission Risk Belief, Discontinuity
at Training Session
(b) Sex Acts in Past Week, Discontinuity at
Training Session
(c) HIV Transmission Risk Belief, Discontinuity
at Training Session (control group only)
Notes: The sample is 1,292 sexually active adults who were successfully interviewed at both
baseline and endline. HIV transmission risk belief is the perceived probability of contracting
HIV from a single unprotected sex act with an infected partner. Sex acts in past week are
measured using a seven-day retrospective sex diary.
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A: Discontinuity at Training Session
RD Estimate -0.148** 0.476 0.041 -0.876
Standard Error (0.069) (0.362) (0.085) (1.926)
Conventional p-value [0.033] [0.189] [0.632] [0.649]
Robust p-value 0.034 0.155 0.698 0.400
Sample: 1,289 1,292 1,292 1,292
Control-group Baseline X X X X
Treatment-group Baseline X X X X
Control-group Endline
Treatment-group Endline
Observations 1,289 1,292 1,292 1,292
B: Discontinuity at Training Session, Control Group Only
RD Estimate -0.019 0.318 -0.004 -1.379
Standard Error (0.144) (0.346) (0.170) (2.227)
Conventional p-value [0.896] [0.358] [0.981] [0.536]
Robust p-value 0.776 0.173 0.748 0.386
Sample:
Control-group Baseline
Treatment-group Baseline X X X X
Control-group Endline X X X X
Treatment-group Endline
Observations 1,308 1316 1316 1316
Notes: Sample includes 1,376 sexually-active adults who were successfully interviewed
at both baseline and followup. Regression discontinuity estimates generated first-
degree polynomials and automatic bandwidth selection following Calonico et al. (2014).
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered by village, in parentheses: ∗p < 0.1;
∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
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were collected using a retrospective sex diary originally developed by (Kerwin et al., 2011).
In this module, interviewers walked respondents through each of the previous seven days to
record details about each sex act on each day as well as other events on that day. The other
events included when they woke up and went to sleep, whether they or their partners were
menstruating, and alcohol consumption. These other details were included to capture risk
factors and to help respondents remember specifics about their sexual activity, similar to
an event-history calendar (Belli et al., 2001) or a relationship-history calendar (Luke et al.,
2011). This module was complicated to carry out and required the most attention when
teaching interviewers to conduct the survey. If the complexity of the questions assessing
HIV risk perceptions led to changing response patterns as interviewers gained experience,
we might also expect a similar pattern for the sex diary questions.
Panel b of Figure 3.2 presents an RD plot for the number of sex acts in the past week, as
reported on the sex diary module. The left side of the graph (before the HIV information
training session) shows no clear trend, although a dip is visible just before the training
session. Notably, this dip is matched on the right side of the graph, so that the confidence
intervals for the bins just before and just after the discontinuity largely overlap. In column
2 of Table 3.2, panel A, we show numeric estimates of the size of this RD. Consistent with
the graph, there is a small positive but statistically insignificant difference.
The HIV information training session occurred during a six-day gap in the data collection
schedule. To assess whether a break in surveying could be creating the differences in the
baseline responses, we look for discontinuities in responses between the end of the baseline
survey and the beginning of the endline survey; there was a 10-day break in data collection
between the two survey waves. Using the control-group data only, panel c of Figure 3.2 plots
an RD for the recorded HIV risk perceptions in the baseline surveys (left side of the graph)
versus the endline surveys (right side). The confidence intervals overlap, and the estimated
difference (column 1 of Table 3.2, panel B) is nearly zero and statistically insignificant.
We see similar null results for the number of sex acts in the past week from the sex diary,
suggesting that a break in surveying per se does not appear to have effects on the recorded
survey responses.
A potential threat to the identification of these RD estimates is that there could have
been systematic sorting of respondents around the breaks in data collection. If different
kinds of respondents were interviewed just before the training session versus just after, it
would be incorrect to attribute the 15 percentage point drop in recorded risk beliefs to the
effect of the training session. To test for this sort of systematic sorting, columns 3 and 4 of
Table 3.2 present RD estimates for fixed respondent characteristics: gender and age. There
are no statistically significant differences in either characteristic for the HIV information
training session or for the end of the baseline.
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Imbalance
A second potential explanation for the differences between the treatment and control-
group beliefs at baseline is imbalance. Although our randomized experiment ensures that the
two groups were balanced in expectation, for any given realization of the random assignment
it is possible for them to have differences (Frison and Pocock, 1992). Those differences could
in turn lead to different beliefs. A particular concern is balance on sexual activity, which is
correlated with risk beliefs (Smith and Watkins, 2005). While the sexual activity variables
in Panel A of Table 1 are balanced overall, the first five rows all show higher values for
the control group than the treatment group. To test for an aggregate balance problem in
these variables, we construct an alternate sexual activity index that uses those first five
variables alone. The difference is not statistically significant (p = 0.149). However, even
a statistically-insignificant difference in this variable could lead to substantively-important
differences in the belief variables. To mitigate this concern, we control for this alternate
sexual activity index in all our regression analyses. Our results do not depend on this choice:
the main effects on beliefs from Table 3.1 are barely changed if we drop this control or if
we drop the interviewer fixed effects as well .
Another potential source of imbalance concerns variations in religion, ethnicity, and lan-
guages spoken across the two groups. HIV risk perceptions and sexual behavior vary widely
by religious denomination in Malawi (Trinitapoli, 2009; Trinitapoli and Regnerus, 2006)
and ethnicity-specific cultural activities, such as initiation rites, are ways that people learn
about sexual health (Munthali and Zulu, 2007). Administering surveys in an unfamiliar
language can lead to item nonresponse and systematic measurement error (Andreenkova,
2018). This could be an issue given that all our surveys were administered in Chichewa,
but this concern is substantially mitigated by the fact that virtually all our subjects are
fluent speakers of either Chichewa or the mutually intelligible language Chinyanja. In the
1998 Malawi census, 96% of households in the study area (TA Mwambo) reported that their
most commonly used language was Chichewa or Chinyanja (Minnesota Population Center,
2019).
Table A.5 in the appendix shows balance statistics for specific religious denominations
as well as ethnic groups. Panel A shows that although the treatment is balanced in terms
of the share of Christians and Muslims (Table A.2 in the appendix), there are important
differences across study arms for some specific denominations. In contrast, the treatment
is fairly balanced by ethnic group (panel B). However, this pattern may mask potential
differences in language abilities within ethnic groups. Because the survey did not ask
respondents whether they speak Chichewa at home or whether it was their first language,
we use Chichewa-language literacy as a proxy for ability to speak the language. Table A.6 in
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the appendix shows balance statistics for literacy in Chichewa by ethnic group. There are no
large differences, but the 2 percentage point difference for the “other” group is statistically
significant.
To account for potential differences in responses driven by these variations in religion and
ethnicity, we add indicators for membership in each group to our regression. We also add
indicators for a person being from a given ethnic group and also literate in Chichewa. The
results are in Table A.7 in the appendix. The effects on measured risk beliefs are essentially
unchanged: they remain statistically significant and are slightly larger, on average.
Spillovers
The similarity in responses between the treatment baseline and control endline surveys
implies that interviewer knowledge drives our results rather than some other change that
occurred at the time of the training session. This similarity could also have arisen through
spillovers: if treatment-group respondents told control-group respondents about the infor-
mation they learned, then we would expect a fall in control-group beliefs. To test for this
possibility, we use social network data to count the number of total friends each respondent
has as well as the number they have who live in treatment-group villages. We then estimate
the following equation:
Yi = α+ βTi + ηTotalFriendsi + γTreatedFriendsi + εi, (3.3)
where Yi is the respondent’s endline risk belief; we also run versions of the regression that
break out the spillovers by study arm. Eq. (3.3) identifies spillover effects on endline beliefs
because a respondent’s number of treated friends is randomly assigned conditional on their
total number of friends (Kremer and Miguel, 2007). We see no evidence of spillovers onto
the control group. Spillovers could also have occurred if control-group respondents sought
out information about HIV because they were asked about it. We cannot rule out this
possibility, but it is unlikely to have generated the observed empirical pattern. To do so,
the control group’s information-seeking would need to have led to endline beliefs that were
nearly identical to the (measured) baseline beliefs for the treatment group. This is unlikely
because the treatment group did not have any time to seek out information about HIV risks
prior to answering the baseline questions about risk beliefs.
3.6 Mechanisms
Our results show that being surveyed by a more-knowledgeable interviewer causes a
decrease in recorded risk beliefs, and that this effect occurs not just for the risks that the
interviewer was directly taught about but also for related risks. We explore three possible
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mechanisms for these spillovers between interviewer knowledge and the (recorded) beliefs
of survey respondents.
3.6.1 Priming
Given that the surveys involve a face-to-face conversation between respondents and
interviewers, interviewer knowledge could affect recorded responses via priming. We find
evidence that trained interviewers primed respondents to give answers that matched the
exact numbers used in the training. Table 3.3 shows regressions of indicator variables that
take a value of 1 when respondents answered exactly 10% for each one of the risk belief
questions; this is the exact figure that the interviewer training provided as the true value
of the HIV transmission risk per year for unprotected sex. Interviewer training makes
respondents more likely to answer exactly 10% for the per-act risk of unprotected risk
(column 1), even though that is not the true risk.7 We therefore interpret this coefficient as
the result of interviewers priming or nudging respondents toward lower responses to all risk
belief questions, not just the one corresponding to the information treatment. However, we
do not see an increase in reporting an answer of exactly 10% in column 2 (the annual risk),
where it is the correct answer. A potential explanation is that respondents have extremely
high priors for this figure: the average risk belief is 93%. In columns 3 and 4 (condom-
protected sex risks), we see slight reductions in the chance that people report exactly 10%.
Because those questions immediately followed the questions about unprotected sex risk, this
could be explained by respondents updating their risk beliefs consistently: if condoms lower
the risk by a factor X, and the unprotected-sex risk is 0.1, then the condom-protected risk
is 0.1X.
These results are consistent with the literature on priming and anchoring, which has
shown that mentioning numbers will induce people to give answers to subsequent questions
that are more similar to those numbers (Newell and Shanks, 2014). This can happen by
directly suggesting a potential answer, exposing respondents to peers’ responses (Tversky
and Kahneman, 1974), or even mentioning totally unrelated numbers (Chapman and John-
son, 2002; Mussweiler et al., 2000).8 Although all three priming pathways are possible in
our context, the first is the most likely. Interviewers were trained to encourage respondents
to answer even if they were not sure, and one way they might have done so is to ask leading
questions like, “Do you think it might be X%?” It is likely that interviewers who were
exposed to the training were more likely to suggest 10% as a possible answer.
7The information treatment mentioned only the annual transmission risk for unprotected sex, and the
figure provided for the true risk was 10%. The true transmission risk per act is approximately 0.1%.
8Similarly, (Delavande et al., 2017) found that subjective beliefs are affected by the exact wording of the
question—in that research, framing a question as being about mortality versus survival.
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Table 3.3: Treatment Effects on Answering Exactly 10%
(1) (2) (3) (4)









Treatment 0.0427*** 0.00665 -0.0507*** -0.0201
(0.0117) (0.00601) (0.0189) (0.0171)
Control-group mean 0.022 0.005 0.100 0.100
Control-group SD 0.146 0.068 0.300 0.300
Observations 1,282 1,277 1,284 1,277
Notes: All regressions control for stratification cell and interviewer fixed effects, as well
as the alternate sexual behavior index from Appendix Table A.2. Sample includes 1,292
sexually-active adults who were successfully interviewed at both baseline and endline.
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered by village, in parentheses: ∗p < 0.1;
∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
3.6.2 Encouraging Guesses
Another opportunity for interviewer knowledge to affect respondents’ recorded beliefs
comes from the structure of our subjective belief elicitation questions. These were designed
such that whenever respondents answered 50% to any risk belief question, a follow-up
question asked whether they really thought the answer was 50%, or whether they were just
unsure. If respondents said they were just unsure, they were asked for their best guess.
This approach was adapted from the U.S. Health and Retirement Survey (HRS), with the
goal of reducing the use of 50% as a proxy for respondent uncertainty; see Hudomiet et al.
(2011) for a discussion of this technique.
These follow-ups initiated another interaction between the interviewer and respondent,
creating an additional opportunity for interviewer knowledge to spill over onto survey re-
sponses. Table 3.4 shows our exploration of that additional interaction, in the case of per-act
transmission risks for unprotected sex. We create indicator variables for when respondents
answered 50% (column 1) and for when they changed, decreased, or increased their answer
when asked the follow-up question (columns 2–4). Columns 5 and 6 also show whether
answers decreased or increased, restricting the sample to those respondents who initially
answered 50%.
Respondents in the treatment and control groups are equally likely to answer 50% and
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment 0.0161 -0.0126 0.000651 -0.0133 -0.00832 -0.115*




N N N N Y Y
Control-group
mean
0.115 0.042 0.008 0.034 0.0676 0.297
Control-group
SD
0.319 0.201 0.088 0.182 0.253 0.460
Observations 1,285 1,285 1,285 1,285 159 159
Notes: All regressions control for stratification cell and interviewer fixed effects. Sample in-
cludes 1,292 sexually-active adults who were successfully interviewed at both baseline and end-
line. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered by village, in parentheses: ∗p < 0.1;
∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
equally likely to change their answer after the follow-up (column 2). However, respondents
who were exposed to this additional interaction were significantly less likely to increase the
answer after the follow-up question when they were interviewed by a trained interviewer,
as shown in columns 4 and 6 of Table 3.4. Column 6 shows that conditional on initially
answering 50%, respondents exposed to informed interviewers were almost 20 percentage
points less likely to increase their answer. This magnitude is large, considering that only
about 30% of those in the control group increased their answers after the follow-up question.
We interpret these results as additional evidence that interviewers who were exposed to
the information treatment influenced the responses given by communicating the follow-up
question in a way that nudged or primed respondents not to increase their answers. Such
subtle communication could be anything from a change in tone of voice or body language
to the choice of words.9 A specific possibility is that instead of asking whether the number
could be more or less than 50%, they asked only if it could be less. We do not believe
interviewers did this intentionally: they knew that the purpose of the intervention was to
study the respondents’ knowledge and behaviors, and their incentive was to record infor-
mation accurately. Rather, we believe that interviewers inadvertently nudged respondents
9Ideally, we would have directly observed some interviews to measure the microprocesses that drove the
knowledge spillovers. We do not do this for two reasons. First, the study was not designed to measure these
spillovers. Second, direct participation in the survey by outsiders, especially White foreigners, can itself
affect respondents’ behaviors (Cilliers et al., 2015).
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toward lower answers. Equally possible is that interviewers who were not exposed to the
information treatment nudged respondents to provide higher answers, potentially stemming
from their own (high) beliefs prior to the information treatment.
3.6.3 Interviewer Knowledge and Respondent Priors
If interviewer knowledge spillovers indeed operate through nudges and priming that take
place during the survey interview, we would expect the effects to be smaller for respondents
who are more confident in their beliefs. Because our outcomes are measured at the base-
line survey, we do not have direct measures of respondents’ beliefs in the absence of the
knowledge spillovers. However, some of their other characteristics may be useful proxies.
Table 3.5 examines treatment effect heterogeneity by a range of respondent characteristics,
estimated using Eq. (3.2). We observe significant heterogeneity by years of schooling and
total assets.
These characteristics are correlated with one another, and thus we may be finding spu-
rious heterogeneity by some characteristics due to omitted variable bias. Therefore, we
include all eight interactions in column 9 and add interactions with additional character-
istics as well in column 10. In our preferred specification, column 10, only the interaction
between treatment and years of schooling remains significant.10 The positive coefficient
for years of schooling means that the main treatment effect (the effect of having a more
knowledgeable interviewer) is smaller in magnitude for those with more education.
To further explore this finding, we run another set of regressions with the dependent
variable being beliefs about HIV transmission risks per unprotected sex act and the in-
dependent variables including the treatment interacted with seven different measures of
schooling: years of schooling, having completed at least Form 1 or Form 2, and having com-
pleted Forms 1–4.11 The results suggest that the treatment effects are lowest for people who
reached Form 2. Although our survey respondents were all adults, most had not attended
secondary school. Just 20% had completed Form 1, and only 17% had completed Form 2.
Form 2 is the point at which students in Malawi are most exposed to information on
HIV transmission and sexual health.12 NGOs in Malawi also tend to target students of
10The standard errors in this specification may be overstated because of multicollinearity between age,
years of schooling, and years sexually active. The condition number for the three variables is nearly 18; a
figure greater than 10 can indicate that coefficients are unstable. However, the variance inflation factors are
all well below the usual cutoff of 10.
11Form 1 in Malawi is the equivalent of ninth grade in the United States.
12HIV education was moved from other subjects into a course called life skills in the early 2000s (Chamba,
2009). When this change was initially rolled out in 2001–2002, HIV was included only in the secondary school
life-skills curriculum. The current life skills curriculum in upper primary school (grades P5–P8) is supposed

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































this age for HIV-prevention interventions; in other African countries, it is also common to
target HIV-prevention campaigns toward students early in secondary school (Gallant and
Maticka-Tyndale, 2004). The narrative to which students in Malawi are exposed in these
lectures and courses is that HIV is highly contagious, which should lead to high risk beliefs
and high certainty about those beliefs.13
Other people have likely heard about the information provided to students in Form
2—for example, by hearing about it from their friends. Other institutions such as NGOs and
church groups attempt to teach about HIV transmission, and so other people may also have
strong priors about HIV transmission risks. However, direct exposure to this information
in school could lead people to be more certain about it and thus less susceptible to nudges
by interviewers.14
3.7 Preventing and Mitigating Interviewer Knowledge Ef-
fects
Researchers can combat the potential spillover of interviewer knowledge onto recorded
subjective beliefs in a variety of ways. First, researchers can try to alter how interviewers are
recruited and trained. Recruitment matters because these spillovers can occur whenever
interviewers and respondents differ in their knowledge levels. Researchers should recruit
interviewers who match the respondent population as closely as possible, particularly in
terms of education and exposure to information relevant to the survey questions. This will
prevent knowledge effects, assuming that the effect we measure is driven by gaps between
interviewers’ and respondents’ knowledge. Controlling for interviewer fixed effects can help
eliminate the effects of any remaining knowledge differences by purging the results of any
interviewer-specific patterns. The survey design should also include exact scripts for asking
belief questions to minimize selective nudges by the interviewer. Training sessions should
emphasize the potential for these spillovers and coach interviewers on how to avoid them.
Second, the problem can be tackled through changes in the design of experiments when
Based on conversations with Ministry of Education officials in Malawi in 2012, at that time HIV education
was done only in secondary schools. An examination of the textbooks for the secondary-school life skills
courses revealed HIV content in all four grades, but HIV transmission risks were covered only in Form 2
(Kadyoma et al., 2012).
13This idea is supported by the correlation between risk beliefs and schooling for the control group: more
schooling is associated with higher priors.
14Another potential explanation for the fact that more-educated people respond less to the treatment is
that education may make people more confident and better able to withstand influence from outsiders. We
cannot directly test this explanation against the effect of HIV education on the strength of people’s priors.
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studies involve information treatments. Possible solutions include either running the base-
line surveys simultaneously across the treatment and control groups or separating the in-
formation treatment from the survey data collection entirely. Each strategy has important
potential drawbacks. Running simultaneous surveys across study arms creates the possi-
bility that respondents will be given the wrong version of the survey and thus be uninten-
tionally exposed to the information treatment, creating a far worse contamination problem.
Running the information treatment separately from the survey—for example, via village
meetings—can make it difficult to prevent nontargeted people from receiving the informa-
tion. For example, diagrams that are distributed as handouts could potentially make their
way into the hands of control-group subjects. Thus incorporating information treatments
into surveys is likely to minimize information spillovers, not exacerbate them, but at the
cost of yielding potentially biased measurements of respondent beliefs. If accurate measures
of respondent beliefs are not a main goal of the study, this may be an acceptable risk. For
example, if the goal of an experiment is to see how much an information treatment shifts
behaviors, then mismeasured beliefs are not a problem even if they affect only one of the
study arms. Even when examining treatment effects on risk beliefs is an important goal of
the study, interviewer knowledge contamination is a problem only if it interacts with the
actual treatment. Apart from information experiments, knowledge spillovers are likely to
occur simply because interviewers differ in their knowledge and beliefs. Providing inter-
viewers with a basic level of knowledge about important survey topics could help them do
their jobs better and lead to better-quality data.
A third solution to this issue is to collect subjective expectations in a way that avoids any
direct interaction with interviewers, such as by using computer-assisted self-interviewing
(CASI). This would eliminate any possibility of interviewer knowledge spilling over onto
respondents’ survey responses. Research on CASI has shown it to be effective in low-
literacy settings (Hahn et al., 2003; van de Wijgert et al., 2000). Important limitations
exist, however: participants may not be able to clarify questions (Group, 2007), computers
may be received with suspicion in certain settings (Hewett et al., 2004; Mensch et al., 2003),
and bystander presence might affect results and should be recorded or controlled (Aquilino
et al., 2000 May-Jun). Potdar and Koenig (2005) argued that CASI will not yield more-
honest answers if people are not comfortable using computers. In low-literacy settings,
audio computer-assisted self-interviewing (ACASI) may work well; Rumakom et al. (2005)
showed that it outperforms self-administered questionnaires. However, Soler-Hampejsek
et al. (2013) tested ACASI for collecting data on sexual activity in Malawi and find that it
still leads to high rates of inconsistency in responses. Similarly, Mensch et al. (2008) showed
that face-to-face interviews generate lower rates of inconsistencies in responses than ACASI,
as well as stronger correlations between reported sexual behavior and biomarkers for HIV
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infection. To improve the quality of subjective expectation data in developing countries,
more work on adapting CASI and ACASI to overcome these limitations is needed. One
promising approach is to use computer tablets to have respondents play simple games that
convey information; Tjernström et al. (2019) showed that this approach is successful in a
population of Kenyan farmers.
3.8 Conclusion
Leveraging a randomized experiment that used interviewers to measure subjective HIV
transmission risks and provide information to treatment group participants, we find that
interviewer knowledge affects the recorded values of survey respondents’ subjective beliefs.
This information spillover occurs not only for the information directly given to the inter-
viewers but also for other related risks.
We identify several channels through which these effects happen. They are evident at
various points in the survey, including the follow-up questions triggered by respondents
answering 50%. This result suggests that additional interactions between interviewers and
respondents present the potential for more spillovers. Our evidence suggests that interviewer
effects work via priming or nudging rather than interviewers directly revealing information.
We find that interviewer effects are weaker for more-educated people, possibly because
those respondents received information about HIV transmission directly at school. This
could make them more certain about their prior beliefs than those who heard information
secondhand, even if the level of those beliefs is not different across education levels.
Our results have important implications for demographers as well as other social scien-
tists who study subjective expectations themselves or phenomena that are driven by people’s
subjective beliefs. Subjective expectations have proven to be useful tools for understanding
and forecasting the main demographic processes of fertility, mortality, and migration, but
these uses rely on being able to measure them correctly. Researchers need to be aware of
the possibility that interviewer knowledge will spill over onto respondents’ recorded beliefs,
which could have substantive effects on results that use those beliefs. Although our findings
relate to HIV risk beliefs, interviewer knowledge effects could occur for any subjective ex-
pectation where the interviewer knows more than the respondent—including other diseases
such as Ebola or COVID-19, and also other domains where subjective expectations play a
role, such as conception probabilities, mortality rates, and the returns to migration. Our
results were obtained in a setting where interviewers were evaluated based on recording
responses correctly; these results may not generalize to settings where interviewers have
some interest in recording specific responses.
We suggest methods for correcting this problem at several points during the course of a
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research project. These include mindful recruiting of interviewers to match the knowledge
levels of the respondent population, emphasizing the potential for spillovers in training,
and designing the experiment in such a way that interviewers survey both study arms while
having the same information set. The most promising way to avoid interviewer knowledge
effects is to collect data via CASI or ACASI to reduce the scope of interaction between
respondent and interviewer, but both methods have issues with data quality. Interviewer
knowledge effects are therefore likely to remain an issue for measuring subjective beliefs in
developing-country settings for the foreseeable future.
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Chapter 4
Soup Kitchens and Food Security:
The Case of Mexico’s Crusade
Against Hunger
4.1 Introduction
Food security and nutrition are two important aspects of development. At the World
Food Summit of 1996, the following definition of food security was adopted: “Food security
exists when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe
and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and
healthy life.” Famines, hunger and malnutrition have been a major concern for high and low
income countries, and increasingly so as we expect climate change to worsen food access for
many people. Researchers have found various negative effects of food insecurity -short and
long term pervasive effects on variables ranging from low productivity to decreased child
health (Gundersen and Kreider, 2008), and reduced non-cognitive development (Howard,
2011).
This has led governments all around the world, as well as international organizations,
to spend large amounts of resources in programs aimed at ensuring food security for their
population. Examples of such programs include soup kitchens and food banks1. These
programs, such as TEFAP by the USDA, have been promoted as means to alleviate food
insecurity. However, little evidence has been presented about the effect of these interventions
1For the purpose of this chapter, food banks and soup kitchens are defined as spaces where food is
provided either for free or at a subsidized price with the purpose of aiding people who face economic
hardship and other issues that hinder their food access. Soup kitchens serve prepared food on the premises
while food banks hand out food products to be prepared and consumed elsewhere.
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in individual or aggregate outcomes.
In the absence of randomized control trials, it has been difficult to evaluate the effective-
ness of soup kitchen and other in-kind food provision programs on food security, given the
endogeneity of treatment as well as participation misreporting. There is some evidence that
SNAP and School lunches improve food security in the US (Kreider et al. (2012), Gunder-
sen et al. (2012), Kreider et al. (2016)). There is also evidence from a small-scale program
(Mousa and Freeland-Graves, 2019) that shows positive effect of in-kind food provision on
food security. Scholars have also written about how emergency vs. sustained provision pro-
grams may have very different implications, since food insecurity is a complex phenomenon,
thus suggesting chronic and acute food insecurity should be tackled differently.
While subsidized food supply is attractive as a potential solution to food insecurity,
there are conditions under which soup kitchens would not necessarily improve food security
or nutrition. A few examples of such conditions include poor targeting, implementation
issues, crowding out, or low quality food provision. Poor targeting could mean that the
people who actually attend the soup kitchen are not the food-insecure. Crowding out refers
to the program acting as a substitute of previously existing ways of accounting for food
insecurity such as previously existing soup kitchens, social cooperation, or other transfers
or donations. In either of these cases, food security would not improve with a soup kitchen
the program. Additionally, even if the target population is the treated population and they
were not crowding out other previous mechanisms dealing with food insecurity, if the soup
kitchens do not provide foods for an adequate nutrition, they would not help eliminate many
of the effects of food insecurity and malnutrition. In other words, the fact that some people
are attending soup kitchens is not sufficient for overall food security to improve, given the
current and widely accepted definition of food security.
In this chapter, I estimate the effects of having access to a soup kitchen on food security,
using a program implemented in Mexico starting on 2013. I observe a sample of Mexican
households from 2012-2014, which allows me to evaluate only short term effects of the
program. I take a difference-in-differences approach to estimate the effect of the program on
six different measures of food security, standard in the literature. I compare municipalities
with a program-funded soup kitchen to ex-ante similar municipalities without one. Using the
Nationally representative Encuesta Nacional de Ingreso y Gasto de los Hogares (ENIGH),
which is a repeated cross-section household survey, I am able to control for proxies of social
capital within communities. I also link electoral data at the municipal level to explore
differences across municipal and state political alignment to the Federal government.
I find that the presence of a soup kitchen in the municipality shows no mean effect on
any one of my measures of food security. To explore the possibility of program effects being
concentrated on the left tail of the food security distribution, I perform the same analysis
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for subsets of the most food insecure individuals within municipalities. I find some evidence
that there is indeed a larger effect on the most food insecure population, however, my study
is under-powered for this analysis.
Exploiting the rules of the program, I perform robustness checks using municipal political
alignment with the federal government as a triple difference. My results suggest that it is
not through perverse political alignment incentives that the program has not shown mean
effects.
My contribution is twofold: evaluating the effect of the soup kitchen program on the
mean and on lower percentiles of the food security distribution, and exploring possible
channels through which the program has failed to show positive mean effects on food secu-
rity. The conclusions of this study are important pieces of information for policy makers.
Moreover, the caveats of this study show that there is a pressing need for better data of
the target population, including take-up, in order to thoroughly evaluate these programs.
Finally, this study shows that sometimes policymakers may target objectives that are not
the most pressing to beneficiaries.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: in Section 4.2 I give an account of
the structure of the program and the context of its implementation. In Section 4.3 I present
and describe the data. Section 4.4 contains the results for my initial difference-in-differences
estimation and further analyses investigating effects on different parts of the distribution
of food security, effects on food expenditure, and the political-incentives channel. Lastly, I
conclude on Section 4.5.
4.2 Background
The Mexican government announced in 2012 that they were launching a set of pro-
grams they called their “Crusade Against Hunger”, implemented by the social development
agency of the federal Mexican government (SEDESOL). The Crusade consisted of more than
60 programs, many of which already existed (such as Prospera, formerly known as Opor-
tunidades), but would receive new funding under the Crusade’s budget. The goals of the
Crusade were varied, but included “zero hunger”, or adequate nutrition for those in extreme
multidimensional poverty and without adequate food access, as defined by CONEVAL, the
decentralized agency in charge of poverty measurement and policy evaluation in Mexico.
Other goals of the Crusade were to eliminate acute child malnutrition, increase income for
small agricultural households and decrease post-harvest food waste.
The soup kitchen program I study in this chapter began with the Crusade. Its announce-
ment was accompanied by the rules under which the program would operate (SEDESOL,
2013). Once a soup kitchen was set up, it would feed up to 120 people, twice a day, five
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days a week. Those who receive meals at the soup kitchen had to be part of the “at risk
population”, meaning they should be in a state of poverty, malnutrition or being at risk of
experiencing it. The Crusade stated that children, pregnant women and the elderly should
be prioritized, however there were no formal mechanisms to enforce these priorities.
Soup kitchens are staffed by volunteers from the community, and some members who
may offer their labor in exchange for meals. One day working at the kitchen can be ex-
changed for meals for up to three people that day. For the operation of the soup kitchen,
the federal government provided up to around $7,000 USD in kitchenware2 and sends a
monthly bundle of non-perishables valued up to $4,000 USD. The federal government also
provided training for the kitchen volunteers through the army, navy and other government
agencies. Additionally, kitchens could charge up to $1 USD per day per person, to account
for either buying perishable goods or paying electricity or water bills. An exploratory study
(CONEVAL, 2015) showed that soup kitchens generally didn’t charge or charged well under
the established limit.
Setting up a soup kitchen, however, required several steps. First, Crusade municipali-
ties were selected, on the basis of their poverty indicators and other features3. Only these
municipalities were eligible for accessing Crusade funds. Afterwards, in communities within
the selected municipalities, a committee must then be democratically4 elected. The com-
mittee must apply for funding to set up a soup kitchen. In this application, the committee
must provide a list of people who would benefit from the soup kitchen, who are part of the
target population and live within the community. The application must also include the
list of volunteers who will staff the kitchen, and it must specify the physical space in which
the soup kitchen will be set up. There is a preference in the program for setting up kitchens
in publicly owned spaces (except schools, which are not allowed to house soup kitchens),
but could be private if no public spaces are available. In this case, the owner must agree
in writing to lend the building to the program for at least a year. The space must have
running water and must be big enough to house a dining space for up to 120 people and
the kitchen space, among other restrictions (SEDESOL, 2013).
There are some potential issues with this program design. One of them is not targeting
the poorest communities, where food security may be more pressing. It is conceivable that
poorer communities find it harder to set up a committee, find a space to set up the kitchen
and request funding, with the bureaucratic process it entails. In fact, the literature suggests
that communities with lower social capital are more at-risk of food insecurity (Martin et al.,
2Depending on the type of kitchen: rural or urban
3CONEVAL (2014) noted that out of the first 400 municipalities selected, 16 did not satisfy the strict
indicator selection
4There are no guidelines within the program description as to what this means exactly, nor are there
ways to enforce it
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2004). Considerable support from local authorities is also needed, in particular with the
provision of the physical space. The design of the program could thus be making it harder
for the poorest, most food insecure communities. Regarding targeting, another issue is that
the list of beneficiaries is constructed by the community committee and there is no formal
way of verifying that those attending are part of the target population.
Another potential problem is that since fresh food is not directly provided by the pro-
gram, the nutritional value of the meals served is not directly observed or guaranteed.
Although training is provided to the volunteers, there is no control over what is served and
no direct instruction of how it should be nutritionally composed. Food security improve-
ment would require that the people who are vulnerable actually attend the soup kitchens,
and receive nutritious meals.
In the first year, SEDESOL funded 500 soup kitchens in the state of Guerrero and spent
around US$12,558,000. The following year, the expenditure in the program had risen to
US$77,775,000 and the number of soup kitchens exceeded 3,156 (CONEVAL, 2015). By
2015, SEDESOL announced that 3.4 million Mexicans benefited from the programs of the
Crusade. They argued that soup kitchens and other Crusade programs implied that more
people have secure access to quality food (SEDESOL, 2015).
There has been some journalistic work on quality and variety of the food provided
by the soup kitchens, as well as some anecdotal testimonies of beneficiaries (for example,
Animal-Politico (2016)). CONEVAL carried out an exploratory study in 2014 showing some
interesting results and concluding that the soup kitchen program design was not conducive
to long term benefits. SEDESOL regularly presents its own back of the envelope estimation
of number of people benefited. However, before the present chapter, no empirical evidence
had been presented on how the soup kitchen program had in fact impacted food security
for impoverished Mexicans.
4.3 Data and Empirical Strategy
To study whether this program had any effects on food security in the municipalities
where it was set up, I use two cross-sections of the ENIGH: 2012 and 2014. The ENIGH is
a household level survey. It is a very rich data set that has socio-demographic, expenditure
and other data for each member of the household. It allows me to control for income, a
proxy for social capital, characteristics of the head of the household and others.
There is currently no publicly available data set that lists the operating soup kitchen
and when they opened. To identify municipalities that had a soup kitchen open between
2012 and 2014, I take a list of municipalities with a soup kitchen operating during 2014,
and a list of 2013 Crusade municipalities, exploiting the fact that only the original Crusade
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municipalities were eligible to open a soup kitchen in 2013.
In defining my treatment, I therefore assume that no soup kitchens closed between 2013
and 2014, and that no soup kitchens were opened in non-2013 Crusade municipalities in
that year. Municipalities labeled as treated in my analysis are municipalities that had a
soup kitchen in 2014, and were also eligible to open a soup kitchen in 2013. This assumption
is untestable for now, but it is the best use of the available data.
For my analysis I compare municipalities in which a soup kitchen operated to those
in which none operated during this time even though they were eligible. As dependent
variables, I use a set of six food security related indicator variables from ENIGH. Table 4.1
shows the text of the questions. I construct binary variables, where a value of 1 means that
the household answered ‘yes’ for that question, which indicates the household was at risk
of or experienced food insecurity in the last three months.
Each one of the dependent variables is an imperfect measure reflecting different aspects of
food security, none of them by themselves fully capture the complex phenomenon. Rather
than classifying my sample in food secure vs food insecure by some aggregation of all
variables (Such as in Wilde and Nord (2005), for example) and choosing a cutoff point, I
perform my analyses for each one of them and present all results, to give a more detailed
picture of the effects of the program, following the advice of Maxwell et al. (2014).
All the dependent variables are related to having enough, varied food in a fixed period
of time. For this reason, this data cannot distinguish between chronic and temporary food
insecurity as the indicator variables turn on with one event occurrence, and we observe them
only twice in time. In the present chapter I focus on food security for the whole household,
taking the responses of the household head.
Table 4.1: Measures of Food Security
Q1 Do you ever worry about running out of food due to lack of resources.
Q2 Did you ever run out of food due to lack of resources.
Q3 Did you ever not have enough resources to have healthy and varied meals.
Q4 Did you ever eat low variety meals due to running out of resources. †
Q5 Did you ever skip a meal due to lack of resources. †
Q6 Did you ever eat less than you think is necessary due to lack of resources. †
Notes: †These questions were asked specifically about adults in the household.
Table 4.2 presents summary statistics split between households in crusade municipali-
ties with at least one soup kitchen and households in crusade municipalities without any,
in the 2012 wave. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. Expenditures
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and income are calculated in Mexican Pesos, per month. Male headed households, Literacy,
and Indigenous show the fraction of households headed by men, the fraction of the popula-
tion that can read and write, and the fraction that self-identifies as indigenous. Occupied
Members indicates the number of household members that perform paid work outside the
home. The only significant difference is in the age of the household head. Municipalities
with soup kitchens seem to have younger heads of household on average.
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Table 4.2: Summary Statistics for Treated and Non-treated Households
(1) (2) (3)
Control Treatment Difference
Sum of Food Security Questions 1.720 1.85 0.136
(2.11) (2.13)
Household Head Education 5.590 5.17 -0.419
(2.72) (2.66)
Household Head Age 49.08 47.51 -1.579**
(15.67) (15.67)
Female Headed 0.27 0.25 -0.02
(0.44) (0.43)
Can Read and Write 0.87 0.85 -0.016
(0.23) (0.24)
Occupied Members 1.7 1.72 0.015
(1.08) (1.11)
Per Capita Income 14,763.35 12,236.22 -2,527.12
(27,695.51) (18,676.02)
Number of Members 3.77 3.82 0.052
(1.91) (2.09)
In Kind Transfers Received 653.81 503.35 -150.46
(3,303.04) (2,354.53)
Total Expenditures 34,708.73 30,243.85 -4,464.89
(34,751.34) (30,077.07)
Food Expenditures 8,361.56 8,293.54 -68.016
(6,209.5) (6,565.29)
Native Population 0.31 0.35 0.037
(0.45) (0.46)
Female Members 1.95 1.93 -0.019
(1.24) (1.32)
N 2,121 1,617
Notes: Standard errors, clustered by municipality, are shown in parentheses.
∗p < 0.1; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01
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Figure 4.1 shows the share, by treatment group, of households with different values of
the sum of all six food security binary variables for households in crusade municipalities, in
the 2012 wave of the ENIGH. A value of zero indicates that the household head answered
‘no’ to all questions in Table 4.1, while a value of 6 means the household head answered
‘yes’ to all of them. We can see that the most common value in both sets of households is
zero, which reflects the fact that the phenomenon they describe is not experienced by all
households. However, about half of the households in each group answer yes to at least one
of the questions, highlighting the pervasiveness of food insecurity in this context. There is no
average difference at baseline in the value of the sum for treated and untreated households,
as shown in 4.2.
Figure 4.1: Distribution the Sum of all Food Security Questions at Baseline for Treated and
Non-treated Households
In all specifications, I also control for a proxy of social capital is constructed as an
index of five different answers from the ENIGH questionnaire. The questions are related to
how easy the household believes it would be to obtain something in case of hardship. For
example, how hard would it be for them to borrow a month’s salary if they needed it or
how hard would it be for them to get help to find a job. The answers range from very easy
to very hard, or impossible. The higher the value, the easiest each one would be, so the
higher the index, the more social capital. This measure will be used in all specifications in
the following section as a proxy for the value of social capital. Table 4.3 shows the text of
each question.
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Table 4.3: Social Capital Proxy Questionnaire
If you needed to, how hard would it be to obtain the following
Borrow your household’s monthly income
Someone to care for you if you were sick
Help getting a job
Someone to accompany you to the doctor’s office
Funds for community investments
Someone to help you care for the children in this home
I estimate the following equation, where T is either an indicator variable for municipal-
ities in which soup kitchens open, or how many soup kitchens there were. A is an indicator
for the year 2014, and DID is the product of the two. Xit is a vector of household level con-
trols, and Yitm is either a dummy variable for answering ‘yes’ to the corresponding question
about food security, or the sum of dummies for all questions.
Yitm = γTm + ηAt + βDIDmt + δXitm + εitm (4.1)
4.4 Results
Table 4.4 shows the results of estimating Equation 1 with a binary treatment definition,
on the sample of all eligible municipalities. We can see that the difference in difference
coefficient is not significant for any of the dependent variables. Furthermore, some of the
questions show positive coefficients (Q1, Q2, Q5), while some show negative ones (Q3, Q4,
Q6). for none of the specifications.
It is possible that the effects of this program are concentrated on the lower portion of
the food security distribution, and the effects are too diluted if we estimate them in the
entire population. After all, this is a program designed for the most food insecure, and
about 50% of the sample answers no to every question regarding food security. For this
reason, I estimate the same equation but this time in a restricted sample that includes only
households in the most ex-ante food insecure municipalities. Because the ENIGH is not a
panel, I cannot create a sample of the most ex-ante food insecure households. Therefore,
what I do is focus on households within the most ex-ante food insecure municipalities.
To select the most food insecure municipalities, I construct a food insecurity index, using
the answers of the 6 questions in Table 4.1. I then select municipalities that were in the
highest 10% of the food insecurity index distribution, in other words, the most ex-ante food
insecure municipalities out of the eligible municipalities. Table 4.5 shows the results for
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Table 4.4: Estimation of Equation 1 with Binary Treatment on Measures of Food Security
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Sum
DID -0.0002 -0.0150 0.0005 0.0139 -0.0044 0.0072 0.0020
(0.0176) (0.0112) (0.0116) (0.0120) (0.0111) (0.0094) (0.0043)
After -0.0029 0.0037 0.0023 -0.0103 0.0061 -0.0007 -0.0017
(0.0098) (0.0076) (0.0087) (0.0070) (0.0074) (0.0060 (0.0027)
T=SK Open -0.0085 0.0129 -0.0008 0.0014 -0.0094 0.0028 -0.0016
(0.0164) (0.0116) (0.0141) (0.0124) (0.0138) (0.0091) (0.0043)
Control group mean 0.4493 0.1438 0.3470 0.3541 0.1565 0.2645 1.7152
Control group 0.4975 0.3510 0.4761 0.4783 0.3634 0.4412 2.1106
standard deviation
Observations 13,246 13,246 13,246 13,246 13,246 13,246 13,246
Notes: Controls include state fixed effects, an index of social capital, percapita household
income, gender of the household head, number of children in the household. Standard
errors, clustered by municipality, are shown in parentheses. ∗p < 0.1; ∗∗p < 0.05;
∗∗∗p < 0.01
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Table 4.5: Estimation of Equation 1 with Binary Treatment on Measures of Food Security
for the Restricted Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Sum
DID 0.0375 0.0074 -0.0327 -0.0219 0.0216 -0.0105 0.0014
(0.0711) (0.0749) (0.0411) (0.0497) (0.0765) (0.0489) (0.0194)
After 0.0097 -0.0228 -0.0031 0.0040 0.0109 0.0035 0.0023
(0.0287) (0.0602) (0.0304) (0.0431) (0.0604) (0.0212) (0.0133)
T=SK Open -0.0122 -0.0172 0.0679 0.0425 -0.0186 -0.0549* 0.0075
(0.0321) (0.0572) (0.0429) (0.0348) (0.0731) (0.0257) (0.0125)
Control group mean 0.7638 0.5039 0.6693 0.6535 0.4567 0.6142 3.6614
Control group 0.4264 0.5020 0.4723 0.4777 0.5001 0.4887 2.3611
standard deviation
Observations 666 666 666 666 666 666 666
Notes: Controls include state fixed effects, an index of social capital, percapita household
income, gender of the household head, number of children in the household. Standard
errors, clustered by municipality, are shown in parentheses. ∗p < 0.1; ∗∗p < 0.05;
∗∗∗p < 0.01
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Table 4.6: Estimation of Equation 1 with Continuous Treatment on Measures of Food
Security
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Sum
DID -0.002 -0.001 0.000 0.000* 0.001 0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
After 0.004 0.002 0.001 -0.009 0.002 0.000 0.000
(0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.002)
T=Number of SK 0.001 0.002** -0.001 -0.002*** 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Control group mean 0.449 0.144 0.347 0.354 0.157 0.264 1.715
Control group 0.498 0.351 0.476 0.478 0.363 0.441 2.111
standard deviation
Observations 13,246 13,246 13,246 13,246 13,246 13,246 13,246
Notes: Controls include state fixed effects, an index of social capital, percapita household
income, gender of the household head, number of children in the household. Standard
errors, clustered by municipality, are shown in parentheses. ∗p < 0.1; ∗∗p < 0.05;
∗∗∗p < 0.01
the estimation on this sample. Even for this restricted sample, I estimate no statistically
significant effects for any of the measures of food security, and the sign of coefficients is still
varied.
Using the data I have on how many soup kitchens were set up in each municipality,
I estimate Equation 1 again, this time with a continuous treatment: the number of soup
kitchens that were set up in that municipality. Tables 4.6 and 4.7 show estimations on
the entire sample and the sample of most food insecure respectively. The tables show that
only for the most food insecure, an additional soup kitchen would decrease the sum of all
food security questions (Column 7), thus showing an improvement of food security in that
section of the population. The magnitude is not large, and the estimated coefficient is
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Figure 4.2: Event Analysis for the Full Sample
To provide evidence supporting the parallel trends assumption, I add two more waves
of ENIGH data (2008 and 2010), and estimate the following equation:
Yitm = γTm + ηt + βDIDmt + δXitm + εitm (4.2)
This equation estimates difference-in-differences coefficients for all waves to test for
parallel trends in the past. The thought behind this exercise is that evidence of parallel
trends in the past supports the assumption of counterfactual parallel trends in the future.
Even though this is not a direct test of the untestable assumption, it has become fairly
popular in difference-in-differences papers.
Results of this estimation for the full and restricted samples are shown in Figures 4.2
and 4.3. The figures show that the difference-in-differences coefficients are not significant
for any of the food security questions or the sum of them, except in the full population
for 2010. Figure 4.2 shows statistically significant coefficients for most of the dependent
variables in 2010. This may provide some additional evidence that looking for effects in the
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Figure 4.3: Event Analysis for the Restricted Sample
Figure 4.4 shows the comparison of the sum of all food security questions for treated
and untreated households in time. Comparisons for the entire sample are shown in the left
panel, while the restricted sample appears in the right panel. We can see that in both panels
treatment groups have slightly higher sums on average (more food insecure), and travel quite
close to the average of untreated households. However, in the left panel we do see the two
lines becoming closer between 2010 and 2012, echoing what Figure 4.2 showed. The right
panel shows trends that are closer together, almost fully overlapping, and switching orders
between 2012 and 2014, reflecting the results from Table 4.7.
4.4.1 Effects on Food Expenditure
It is possible that the soup kitchen program did not only affect food security, but also
assisted households in other spheres. One example would be how much people are spending
on food items. Households may have substituted food prepared at home or bought else-
where for the services of soup kitchens, which would slacken households’ budget constraints,
increasing their welfare. The ENIGH includes data on household expenditure on different
goods. I estimate Equation 1 with a continuous treatment definition, using quarterly per-
capita expenditures on food inside the home, outside the home, and the sum total. Table
4.8 shows the results for two sets of households: the restricted set within the most food
insecure municipalities, and the unrestricted set.
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Table 4.8 shows that for households in the most ex-ante food insecure municipalities, all
expenditure in food decreases. Since soup kitchens provided heavily subsidized meals, these
results are consistent with households consuming these meals. It is interesting that the
decrease in food expenditure seems to come from expenses both in and outside the home,
perhaps suggesting that households substitute away from various forms of food access, and
the soup kitchen is not acting as a substitute for a unique mechanism. The effect is smaller
for the sample of all municipalities, as would be expected. It seems to be that even if the
effect on food security was modest, households still benefited from the program in other
margins. This highlights the arguments previously made in the literature that food security
is a complicated phenomenon, and more income may not be sufficient to make an impact.
The fact that food expenditures decrease in this sample of municipalities, together with
only modest effects on food security indicate that this slackening of the budget constraint is
not sufficient to improve people’s food security. One possible reason for this is that the food
provided by the soup kitchens is simply substituting out an equivalent meal that households
were consuming, and the additional cash is used for other purposes that households deem
more pressing. Another possibility is that households cannot use this additional cash to
improve their food security, perhaps because they do not have access to food items that
would allow them to.
Furthermore, it is possible that there is a larger effect on expenditure than food security
due to spillover effects of soup kitchens. For example, soup kitchens may have price effects
where they are set up. Additionally, soup kitchens may be serving people, even in ex-ante
food insecure municipalities, who are not the most food insecure. Thus, some people will
be slackening their budget constraints, but not using that slack for food security because it
is not a pressing issue to them. These potential explanations should be carefully studied,
since they have very different implications for program design.
4.4.2 Political Alignment
Given the rules of the program, not only is community cooperation necessary for treat-
ment, but some collaboration of local authorities is crucial to opening a soup kitchen. In
particular, cooperation with the authorities is important for finding the physical space in
which the Soup Kitchen is to be set up, and perhaps for navigating the funding application
process. Using a triple differences specification, I explore the hypothesis that average treat-
ment effects vary with the degree of cooperation between local authorities and the federal
government.
There is some literature on government level collaboration that has shown that po-
litical party alignment is relevant for policy implementation. For example Durante and
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Gutierrez find that neighboring municipalities that are politically aligned catch criminals
more frequently and have fewer violent crimes. Brollo and Nannicini (2012) find that
federal-municipal political alignment increases discretionary transfers of federal funds to
municipalities.
This program was part of the flagship Crusade of the Mexican Federal Government, led
at the time by Enrique Pena Nieto, from the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI). It
is conceivable that there was less cooperation between the Federally funded program and
non-PRI-led municipal governments than PRI-led municipal governments, since political
incentives were larger for PRI-led municipalities. This could be told as a story of local
political sabotage of the Federal policy, or Federal sabotage of local administrations.
To explore this possibility, I coded an indicator variable for whether the PRI was gov-
erning each municipality when the Program was implemented (2013). I performed a triple
difference estimation, and I present the results in Table 4.9. Results suggest that politi-
cal alignment between the municipality and the Federal government has no impact on the
distribution of the treatment effect. I also performed the analysis for state-level political
alignment and the results remain the same. This is evidence that the lack of average effect
cannot be attributed to a lack of cooperation of non-PRI mayors with the program.
The key feature of Table 4.9 is that neither the difference-in-differences coefficient nor
the triple differences coefficient are statistically different from zero for any of the dependent
variables. These regressions present more evidence of a muted mean effect of the program,
and they reject the hypothesis of non-PRI municipal government sabotage to a federal
program.
4.5 Conclusions
I estimated no municipal mean effect of the Soup Kitchen Program of the Mexican
Crusade Against Hunger on any of six available measures of food security. However, when
focusing only in the most food insecurity municipalities, I estimate a modest effect on the
sum of all six food security questions. I find no evidence that political sabotage is responsible
for the lack of average municipal effect.
Estimating effects of the soup kitchen program on food expenditures in and outside the
home, I find that the program significantly decreases food expenditures for those in the
most ex-ante food insecure municipalities. This result highlights the importance of looking
at different spheres of beneficiaries’ lives. While the effects of the soup kitchen program on
food security may be small and focused only in the very tail of the distribution, the program
seems to act also by slackening the budget constraints of some households. Even in this
slackening does not translate into better food security, it is likely also welfare increasing.
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Table 4.9: Estimation of Equation 3 with Binary Treatment on Measures of Food Security
for the Restricted Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Sum
Triple Differences 0.029 -0.031 -0.051 0.017 -0.038 0.000 -0.074
(0.067) (0.041) (0.061) (0.056) (0.039) (0.052) (0.257)
After 0.053* 0.042 0.023 0.014 0.065*** 0.038 0.236*
(0.0291) (0.0257) (0.03) (0.027) (0.0217) (0.0255) (0.128)
T=SK Open -0.001 0.001 -0.002 -0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.008)
DID -0.048 -0.024 -0.021 -0.006 -0.022 0.002 -0.120
(0.031) (0.029) (0.040) (0.033) (0.026) (0.037) (0.175)
A*PRI -0.044 -0.002 0.051 0.005 -0.037 -0.013 -0.040
(0.046) (0.033) (0.041) (0.046) (0.029) (0.040) (0.192)
T*PRI -0.020 0.021 0.063 -0.018 0.014 -0.003 0.057
(0.052) (0.034) (0.043) (0.044) (0.034) (0.037) (0.194)
PRI 0.046 -0.015 -0.059 -0.023 0.030 0.018 -0.002
(0.064) (0.059) (0.061) (0.067) (0.065) (0.057) (0.321)
Observations 5,701 5,701 5,701 5,701 5,701 5,701 5,701
Notes: Controls include state fixed effects, an index of social capital, per capita house-
hold income, gender of the household head, number of children in the household. Stan-
dard errors, clustered by municipality, are shown in parentheses. ∗p < 0.1; ∗∗p < 0.05;
∗∗∗p < 0.01
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This slackening on the budget constraint could be coming from households buying less
food because they receive it at the soup kitchen, or from general equilibrium effects of soup
kitchens in the food provision market. In that sense, it is possible that the effects I estimate
in this chapter include large spillovers to households who do not attend soup kitchens but
still benefit. These spillovers should also be studied, as they may be especially large in
specific types of communities.
Out of the three initially mentioned channels through which the program could be failing
to improve mean food security, this chapter presents evidence against the hypothesis of lack
of implementation cooperation, and evidence against bad targeting at the municipality
level. It is possible, however, that households that are the most food insecure within a
municipality do not make use of the program. With the current data, it is hard to infer
actual participation in the program, but this should be further pursued. Other possible





Different and complex barriers exist to widespread improvements in the standard of
living conditions. Identifying them and systematically studying them is imperative to im-
prove the lives of those who have not benefited as much from the rise in living conditions
the world has seen in the last century.
As governments and other organizations design policies to reduce these barriers, the
complexities of the different phenomena must be taken into account. In this dissertation
I study barriers in three different margins: gender and the labor market, subjective belief
elicitation, and food security.
In all three chapters, the importance of understanding the complexities of barriers in
different aspects of peoples lives cannot be understated. Chapter 2 shows that women’s
human capital investment is constrained by the work-family tradeoffs they face. To achieve
gender equality, differences in these tradeoffs between men and women need to be addressed,
as they impact more than just labor supply. Chapter 3 shows that when one wants to study
complex and important phenomena, such as the effects of subjective expectations in behav-
ior, one must be careful to measure these without bias. Chapter 4 provides more evidence
that food security is a complex phenomenon, and that seemingly intuitive and simple solu-
tions may not be enough to increase it. It also emphasizes that sometimes policymakers set
goals and objectives that may not be the same as the priorities of beneficiaries. If we wish
to improve peoples’ lives, we need to understand what are the truly important barriers they
face, from their perspective.
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Figure A.1: Timeline of Experiment
Table A.1: HIV Transmission Risk Survey Questions (Female Versions)
H1a. If 100 women, who do not have HIV, each have an HIV-positive sex partner for one year,
and do not use condoms when having sex, how many of the women do you think will have
HIV at the end of the year?
H2a. If 100 women, who do not have HIV, each have an HIV-positive sex partner for one year,
and do use condoms when having sex, how many of the women do you think will have
HIV at the end of the year?
E1a. If 100 women, who do not have HIV, each sleep with a man who is HIV positive tonight
and do not use a condom, how many of them do you think will have HIV after the night?
E2a. If 100 women, who do not have HIV, each sleep with a man who is HIV positive tonight
and do use a condom, how many of them do you think will have HIV after the night?
Notes: Survey questions were gender-specific, so men were asked about 100 men and women were asked about
100 women. All survey questions were asked Chichewa (translated versions available upon request).
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Sexual Activity
Any Sex in Past Week 0.541 0.507 -0.036 1,292
(0.499) (0.500) (0.111)
Sex Acts in Past Week 1.798 1.615 -0.185 1,292
(2.471) (2.380) (0.155)
Unprotected Sex Acts in Past Week 1.569 1.471 -0.100 1,292
(2.376) (2.323) (0.446)
Sex Partners in Past 30 Days 0.818 0.797 -0.024 1,290
(0.498) (0.762) (0.515)
Condoms Acquired in Past 30 Days 4.739 3.530 -1.205 1,288
(15.003) (11.549) (0.122)
Years Sexually Active 13.100 13.204 0.117 1,275
(8.279) (8.603) (0.815)
Lifetime Sex Partners 3.117 3.557 0.414** 1,288
(2.684) (4.734) (0.042)
Any Chance They Have HIV 0.344 0.352 0.008 1,277
(0.475) (0.478) (0.788)
Overall Sexual Activity Index 0.035 -0.035 -0.072 1,292
(1.031) (0.968) (0.168)
Diary Sexual Activity Index 0.028 -0.028 -0.059 1,277
(0.997) (1.003) (0.266)
Alternate Sexual Activity Index† 0.018 -0.053 -0.074 1,287
(1.003) (1.022) (0.149)
Panel B: Demographics
Male 0.425 0.436 0.000 1,292
(0.495) (0.496) (1.000)
Married 0.829 0.803 -0.025 1,290
(0.377) (0.398) (0.316)
Age 29.133 29.589 0.465 1,292
(8.417) (8.333) (0.339)
Years of Schooling 5.758 5.858 0.097 1,292
(3.347) (3.484) (0.723)
Total Living Children 2.940 3.049 0.113 1,292
(2.128) (2.389) (0.373)
Number of People in Household 5.039 4.870 -0.176 1,292
(2.237) (2.036) (0.254)
Spending in Past 30 Days (PPP USD) 292.390 293.010 1.698 1,292
(383.593) (572.544) (0.954)
Total Assets Owned 4.188 3.937 -0.248 1,292
(2.427) (2.311) (0.192)
Christian 0.910 0.927 0.017 1,292
(0.286) (0.260) (0.472)
Muslim 0.085 0.060 -0.025 1,292
(0.280) (0.238) (0.281)
Notes: This table replicates the balance tests from Kerwin (2019). Sample includes 1,292 sexually-active
adults who were successfully interviewed at both baseline and endline. † Alternate Sexual Activity Index is
a PCAindex of the first five variables int he table, to check for a potential aggregate balance problem in
those variables. p-values are for cluster-adjusted t-tests: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.
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Table A.3: Effects of Interviewer Knowledge on Reported Risk Beliefs, Controlling for
Interviewer and Sampling Strata Fixed Effects Only
(1) (2) (3) (4)









Treatment -0.0736*** -0.0348*** -0.0371*** -0.0867***
(0.0190) (0.0128) (0.0127) (0.0155)
Control-group mean 0.828 0.928 0.123 0.237
Control-group SD 0.264 0.169 0.218 0.281
Observations 1,287 1,282 1,289 1,282
Notes: All regressions control for stratification cell and interviewer fixed effects. Sample includes
1,292 sexually-active adults who were successfully interviewed at both baseline and endline.
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered by village, in parentheses: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.
Table A.4: Effects of Interviewer Knowledge on Reported Risk Beliefs, Controlling for
Sampling Strata Fixed Effects Only
(1) (2) (3) (4)









Treatment -0.0928*** -0.0482*** -0.0271** -0.0795***
(0.0188) (0.0119) (0.0114) (0.0151)
Control-group mean 0.828 0.928 0.123 0.237
Control-group SD 0.264 0.169 0.218 0.281
Observations 1,289 1,284 1,291 1,284
Notes: All regressions control for stratification cell and interviewer fixed effects. Sample includes
1,292 sexually-active adults who were successfully interviewed at both baseline and endline.
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered by village, in parentheses: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Religion
Quadiriya Muslim 0.057 0.048 -0.009 1,291
(0.233) (0.214) (0.664)
Sukut Muslim 0.028 0.012 -0.016** 1,291
(0.165) (0.111) (0.045)
Other Muslim 0.000 0.002 0.002 1,291
(0.000) (0.039) (0.310)
Catholic 0.169 0.209 0.039 1,291
(0.375) (0.407) (0.235)
Church of Christ 0.194 0.196 0.002 1,291
(0.396) (0.397) (0.962)
Anglican 0.019 0.028 0.010 1,291
(0.135) (0.165) (0.507)
CCAP 0.126 0.093 -0.034 1,291
(0.332) (0.290) (0.220)
Pentecostal 0.144 0.085 -0.058** 1,291
(0.352) (0.279) (0.017)
Indigenous Christian 0.067 0.028 -0.039*** 1,291
(0.250) (0.165) (0.006)
Other Christian 0.193 0.289 0.096*** 1,291
(0.395) (0.454) (0.002)
African Traditional Religion 0.002 0.002 0.000 1,291
(0.039) (0.039) (0.999)
Atheist 0.000 0.008 0.008** 1,291
(0.000) (0.088) (0.019)
Don’t Know 0.002 0.002 0.000 1,291
(0.039) (0.039) (0.992)
Panel B: Ethnicity
Nyanja 0.460 0.482 0.020 1,292
(0.499) (0.500) (0.678)
Lomwe 0.343 0.394 0.052 1,292
(0.475) (0.489) (0.337)
Yao 0.107 0.068 -0.039 1,292
(0.309) (0.252) (0.156)
Chewa 0.048 0.031 -0.017* 1,292
(0.214) (0.173) (0.072)
Other 0.042 0.025 -0.017 1,292
(0.200) (0.155) (0.111)
Notes: All regressions control for stratification cell and interviewer fixed effects.
Sample includes 1,292 sexually-active adults who were successfully interviewed at
both baseline and endline. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered by
village, in parentheses: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Literate and Nyanja 0.329 0.358 0.027 1,289
(0.470) (0.480) (0.476)
Literate and Lomwe 0.256 0.290 0.033 1,289
(0.437) (0.454) (0.406)
Literate and Yao 0.068 0.050 -0.019 1,289
(0.252) (0.217) (0.355)
Literate and Chewa 0.039 0.025 -0.014 1,289
(0.193) (0.156) (0.134)
Literate and Other Ethnicity 0.036 0.016 -0.020** 1,289
(0.186) (0.124) (0.026)
Notes: All regressions control for stratification cell and interviewer fixed effects. Sample includes 1,292
sexually-active adults who were successfully interviewed at both baseline and endline. Heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors, clustered by village, in parentheses: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.
Table A.7: Effects of Interviewer Knowledge on Reported Risk Beliefs, Adding Controls for
Religion, Ethnicity, and Literacy
(1) (2) (3) (4)









Treatment -0.081*** -0.041*** -0.038*** -0.084***
(0.019) (0.013) (0.014) (0.016)
Control-group mean 0.828 0.928 0.123 0.235
Control-group SD 0.263 0.169 0.218 0.280
Observations 1,278 1,273 1,280 1,273
Notes: All regressions control for stratification cell and interviewer fixed effects. Sample includes 1,292
sexually-active adults who were successfully interviewed at both baseline and endline. Heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors, clustered by village, in parentheses: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.
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Table A.8: Treatment Effect Spillovers
(1) (2) (3) (4)















Treatment -0.397*** -0.397*** -0.406***
(0.019) (0.040) (0.045)
Treated Friends -0.001 -0.017
(0.013) (0.022)
Control × (Treated Friends) -0.012
(0.023)
Treatment × (Treated Friends) 0.019
(0.020)
Total Friends -0.014 0.012
(0.008) (0.011)
Control × (Total Friends) 0.021*
(0.011)
Treatment × (Total Friends) -0.004
(0.014)
Control-group mean 0.829 0.829 0.829 0.829
Control-group SD 0.263 0.263 0.263 0.263
Observations 1,267 1,267 1,267 634
Notes: All regressions control for stratification cell and interviewer fixed effects. Sample includes 1,292
sexually-active adults who were successfully interviewed at both baseline and endline. Heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors, clustered by village, in parentheses: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.
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Table A.9: Collinearity Diagnostics for Age, Years of Schooling, and Years Sexually Active






Det (correlation matrix) 0.21
Condition Number 17.85
Panel B: Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs)
Variable VIF Sqrt VIF Tolerance Rsquared
Age 4.39 2.10 0.23 0.77
Schooling 1.09 1.04 0.92 0.08
Years sexually active 4.53 2.13 0.22 0.78
Mean VIF 3.34
Notes: All regressions control for stratification cell and interviewer fixed effects. Sample includes 1,292
sexually-active adults who were successfully interviewed at both baseline and endline. Heteroskedasticity-














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A.11: Correlations between Schooling Measures and HIV Risk Beliefs in the Control
Group
(1) (2)
Outcome: HIV transmission risk belief
(per-act, unprotected)
Years of Schooling 0.009*** 0.011***
(0.003) (0.003)
Controls for other covariates‡ N Y
Control-group mean 0.8278 0.832
Control-group SD 0.264 0.261
Observations 644 629
Notes: All regressions control for stratification cell and interviewer fixed effects. Sample
includes 1,292 sexually-active adults who were successfully interviewed at both baseline and
endline. Heteroskedasticity- robust standard errors, clustered by village, in parentheses:
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.
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